The Open Court.

A FORTNIGHTLY JOURNAL,

DEVOTED TO THE WORK OF ESTABLISHING ETHICS AND RELIGION UPON A SCIENTIFIC BASIS.

Entered at the Chicago Post-Office as Second-Class Matter.

VOL. I. No. 7. CHICAGO, MAY 12, 1887. { Three Dollars per Year. Single Copies, 15 cts.

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It is an entertaining journal and has some very able writers on religious themes.—*Wonewoc* (Wis.) *Reporter*.

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THE OPEN COURT is a very readable, fortnightly journal published in Chicago. It takes very radical views in a logical and courteous way.—*Attleboro* (Mass.) *Advocate*.

One of the ablest literary magazines now published. The current number is replete with thoughts, original and otherwise, of great brilliancy and expressiveness.—*Merrimac* (Mass.) *Budget*.

THE OPEN COURT is at hand full of good things. There may be some things we cannot agree with, and so there may be some things we do agree with. It is bright, keen and well worth reading.—*Sandwich* (Ill.) *Argus*.

The third number, Vol. I, of THE OPEN COURT arrived this week, and is full of good things, printed with large clear type and on good paper. It is one that will bear unlimited recommendation, and we wish it the best of success. —*Gilmore City Gazette*.

THE OPEN COURT is a new fortnightly publication from Chicago, "Devoted to the Work of Establishing Ethics and Religion upon a Scientific Basis." It is liberal and progressive and ably edited. We cordially welcome it to our table. —*Rockton* (Ill.) *Herald*.

THE OPEN COURT, a fortnightly journal, devoted to the work of establishing ethics and religion upon a scientific basis. This is a neat and a well-conducted journal, and furnishes matter for the thoughtful and inquiring mind.—*The Song Friend*, Chicago.

It is devoted to the interests of liberal religion, and its contributors are among the deep thinkers of our day. It is neatly printed and in type that does not tire the eyes. We were much interested in several articles in the sample received.—*Medfield* (Mass.) *News*.

It numbers some very able writers among its contributors. Among them we notice the names of James Parton, John Burroughs, Felix L. Oswald and Moncure D. Conway. All its articles are thoughtful and exceedingly suggestive.—*Evening Despatch*, Columbus, Ohio.

THE OPEN COURT is the title of a new fortnightly journal published at Chicago and "Devoted to the Work of Establishing Ethics and Religion upon a Scientific Basis." It is a bright and able publication and contains much food for reflection, served up in an attractive manner.—*Beverly* (Mass.) *Citizen*.

THE OPEN COURT is a fortnightly review started in Chicago, with the simple little task on hand of "establishing ethics and religion on a scientific basis." It has undertaken a great work, but it seems to take hold of it just as though it were not afraid, and all for $3 a year.—*City and Country*, Nyack, N. Y.

It is a handsome publication and its literary contents are excellent. It is the only free-thought magazine which is commended by the great religious papers of the country, while battling manfully for its own opinions. THE OPEN COURT will be found the literary equal of the reviews.—*Knoxville* (Ia.) *Express*.

The mechanical work of the publication is not excelled, while the articles contained are ably handled, their authors being among our leading thinkers and writers. It is a work for those who can think for themselves. If all of the contents do not meet your approbation, some of them cannot fail. It is published at Chicago.—*Dana* (Ind.) *News*.

Its principal dependence for evidence, in support of duty and doctrine, is scientific research. It comes to the support of liberalism in religion and radicalism in dealing with it. It is gotten up in good style, ably edited, and has a body of contributors whose writings will be the delight especially of free-thinkers.—*Gardner* (Mass) *Journal*.

It is a publication that will be in demand, and the high tone of its articles will be appreciated and praised by a reading public. It is practically the successor of the Boston *Index*. With such contributors as Moncure D. Conway, Felix Oswald and others equally meritorious, the success of THE OPEN COURT is assured.—*The Gazette*, Centerburg, O.

THE OPEN COURT, a new fortnightly journal published in Chicago, is one of the ablest literary magazines now published. The current number for April 14 contains able articles by James Parton, Lewis G. Janes, Moncure D. Conway, George Jacob Holyoake, and others, as replete with thoughts original, and otherwise of great brilliancy and expressiveness.—*Daily Bulletin*, Haverill, Mass.

THE OPEN COURT is the name of a new and finely-printed magazine recently started in Chicago, published fortnightly, and "Devoted to the Work of Establishing Ethics and Religion upon a Scientific Basis." The sixth number has just been issued, and fairly sparkles with speculative philosophy, theological dissertation and scientific discussion by able pens.—*Chicago Evening Journal*.

On our first page is an article ["A Sorely Tempted Generation"] from THE OPEN COURT, a new publication recently started in Chicago, B. F. Underwood, editor. The publication is "Devoted to the Work of Establishing Ethics and Religion upon a Scientific Basis." It is rich in thought and should, and doubtless will, receive a hearty welcome by the literary public.—*Advocate Tribune*, Indianola, Iowa.

THE OPEN COURT is a fortnightly journal, mainly ethical and religious. Its principal dependence for evidence, in support of duty and doctrine, is scientific research. It comes to the support of liberalism in religion and radicalism in dealing with it. It is gotten up in good style, ably edited, and has a body of contributors whose writings will be the delight especially of free-thinkers.—*Malden* (Mass.) *Mirror*.

THE OPEN COURT, a fortnightly journal published in Chicago, is a welcome visitor in the *Free Trader* editorial office. The number for April 14 contains contributions by James Parton, E. D. Cheney, L. J. Janes, and these, beside other editorials and other matter. It is a live, energetic paper, and is "Devoted to the Work of Establishing Ethics and Religion upon a Scientific Basis."—*Ottawa* (Ill.) *Free Trader*.

It is "Devoted to the Work of Establishing Ethics and Religion upon a Scientific Basis," and through its columns is given to the world much of the latest and profoundest thought upon the various underlying philosophies of religion. THE OPEN COURT succeeds the *Index* as the organ of free thought and free discussion of those subjects which most deeply interest every human intelligence.—*The Independent*, Elkhorn, Wis.

THE OPEN COURT, a journal devoted to establishing ethics and religion upon a scientific basis, and published in Chicago by THE OPEN COURT Publishing Co., with B. F. Underwood as editor and manager, contains some very instructive articles. From an article entitled "Is the Church Worth Saving," by Lewis G. Janes, we make the following extracts. [This paper reprints also, the article by Alfred H. Peters, entitled "A Sorely Tempted Generation." —ED.]—*Staten Island* (N. Y.) *Star*.

We are in receipt of a new publication entitled THE OPEN COURT, a fortnightly journal in magazine form, "Devoted to the Work of Establishing Ethics and Religion upon a Scientific Basis." It has a wide field of operation, but enters upon it with a zeal and ability worthy of success. Its matter is wholly original, and of interest to all careful thinkers. B. F. Underwood, the widely-known lecturer and writer, and his wife, are editors, with numerous able contributors.—*Randolph* (Wis.) *Radical*.

THE OPEN COURT is the name of a fortnightly paper published in Chicago, which is the index of free-thought in religious and scientific matters. It is not the organ of free thinkers in the sense of free license to revile everything good, but of advanced and rational religious thought, in contradistinction to religious bigotry, intolerance and pharisaism—of a religion that is not in direct conflict with the truths of science. It is an excellent journal for a thinking man.—*Independent Practitioner*, New York City.

We are in receipt of No 3, Vol. I, of THE OPEN COURT, a fortnightly journal "Devoted to the Work of Establishing Ethics and Religion upon a Scientific Basis." This new candidate for public favor is published in Chicago, and edited by B. F. Underwood, to whom, Post-office Box F., Chicago, all communications should be directed. From the number before us we take the following extract from a most excellent article entitled: ["The Rights of Those who Dislike Tobacco." By Anna Garlin Spencer.]—*Dairy and Farm Journal*, West Liberty, Ia.

THE OPEN COURT is the name of a new fortnightly journal published in Chicago. "Devoted to the Work of Establishing Ethics and Religion upon a Scientific Basis." The two numbers which have reached us are very interesting. No. 3 has an interesting article by our old friend Professor Gunning, on "Putting Off the Old Man Adam." Among the other writers are Moncure Conway, James Parton, Felix Oswald, M. M. Trumbull and others. It is handy in size, neatly printed, ably edited, and enters on a good work with excellent prospects.—*Waltham* (Mass.) *Free Press*.

The contents of the new publication are of a high order, intellectually; and while we do not agree with the editors on many points, we gladly welcome to our table the new advocate of scientific ethics, and shall read its pages with pleasure and doubtless, much profit. These times are times of reconstruction. All cannot build after one pattern; and only time and the evolution of truth can test the value of any man's work. Let all builders labor, each in his own way, and let there be no strife between the workers, however different their methods. We wish THE OPEN COURT success in its chosen field.—*New Theology Herald*.

Most, if not all, our readers, have heard of *The Index* an advanced free-thought journal published at Boston. THE OPEN COURT takes its place, but is published in Chicago now, fortnightly, by the same aggressive editor that guarded *The Index*, B. F. Underwood. Whenever we hear of B. F. Underwood, either as a writer, as a speaker, or an editor, we always know that what he does is done in a masterly manner. And there is a reason for it. Sara A. Underwood is his assistant, which means that she is his soul, hence his power. May THE OPEN COURT be felt to be a power for good.—*American Non-Conformist*, Winfield, Kan.

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ON MEMORY AS A GENERAL FUNCTION OF ORGANIZED MATTER.*

AN ADDRESS DELIVERED ON OCCASION OF THE SOLEMN MEETING OF THE IMPERIAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, AT VIENNA, MAY 30, MDCCCLXX.

BY EWALD HERING,

MEMBER OF THE IMPERIAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES.

Translated by Dr. Paul Carus, from the Second Edition, published by Carl Gerold's Sohn, Wien, 1870.

Part II.—(Concluded.)

Now let me finally consider those facts in which the strength of memory in organized matter strikes us most powerfully.

On the basis of numerous facts, we may justly assume that even such qualities of an organism can be transferred to its posterity as have not been inherited but were acquired under peculiar circumstances of life. Thus every organic being endows its germs with some small inheritance which was acquired during the individual life of the parental organism and is added to the greater heirloom of the whole race.

Considering that properties were inherited which had been developed on diverse organs of the parental being, it appeared highly enigmatic how these same organs could have influenced the germ which developed in some distant place. So it happened that as a solution of this problem mystic views were often propounded.

The subject may be best comprehended from a physiological standpoint in this way:

The nervous system in spite of its being a composition of many thousands of cells and fibers, nevertheless forms one coherent entirety. It is in communication with all organs; according to later histological researches, it is assumed that it is connected even with every cell of the more important organs, be it directly or at least indirectly through a living, irritable and therefore conductible cell substance. By means of this connection, all organs, it is possible, are more or less interdependent, so as to make the destinies of one re-echo in the others; and if in any way some irritation takes place in one, it is transfused if ever so feebly, to the remotest parts of the body. In addition to this delicate communication of all parts through the nervous tissue, another, a slower and more sluggish communication takes place, that of the circulating fluids.

We notice further on that the process of development of the germs which are destined to attain an independent existence, exercises a powerful reaction upon both the conscious and unconscious life of the whole organism. And this is a hint that the organ of germination is in a closer and more momentous relation to the other parts, especially to the nervous system, than any other organs. In an inverse ratio, the conscious and unconscious destinies of the whole organism, it is most probable, find a stronger echo in the germinal vessels than elsewhere.

This is the path it must be recognized, on which we have to look for the material link between the acquired properties of an organism and such quiddities of a germ as may redevelop the parental qualities.

You may object that an immaterial something cannot be the determinative for the future development of germs so like each other, it must rather be the peculiar character of its material composition. But I answer: The curves and planes which a mathematician imagines, or accepts as imaginable, are more numerous and manifold than the shapes of the organic world. Let us imagine almost infinitely small fragments of all possible curves; they will bear a closer resemblance to each other than one germ does to another. Nevertheless the whole curve is latent in each fragment and suppose a mathematician extends it in its directions, it will grow into the peculiar curve which has been determined by the form of its small fragmentary part.

Therefore it is erroneous to declare that we cannot imagine such minute differences in germs as in this case must be assumed by physiology.

An infinitely minute dislodgment of a point or a complex of points in the fragment of a curve will alter the law of its entire course. Exactly so an evanescent influence of the parental organism upon the molecular structure of its germ suffices to regulate its whole future development.

Now, then, the reappearance of properties of the parental organism in the full grown filial organism can be nothing else but the reproduction of such processes of organized matter, as the germ when still in the germinal vessels had taken part in; the filial organism remembers, so to say, those processes, and as soon as an occasion of the same or similar irritations is offered, a reaction takes place as formerly in the parental organism,

*Presented to the readers of THE OPEN COURT as part of his Monistic views, by Edward C. Hegeler.

of which then it was a part, and whose destinies influenced it.

If in a parental organism by long habit or constant practice something grows to be its second nature, so as to permeate, if it were ever so feebly, also its germinal cells, and if the germinal cells commence an independent life, they aggrandize and grow till they form a new being, but their single parts still remain the substance of the parental being, they are bones of its bones, and flesh of its flesh. If, then, the filial organisms reproduce what they experienced as a smaller part of a greater whole, this fact is marvelous indeed, but no more than when an old man is surprised by reminiscences of his earliest childhood. Whether it be the very same organized substance still which reproduces old experiences, or whether it be its descendant and offspring, a part of itself, which in the meantime deployed and grew, is a difference which, apparently, is one of degree, not of kind. Now, is it not strange that we are engaged at all in considerations, how trifling inheritances of the parental organism can be reproduced in the filial being, as if we had forgotten that the filial organism is nothing but one great reproduction of the parental organism, even in its minutest details? This is because we are so accustomed to accept their similarity as granted, that we are astonished at finding a child who is to some degree not quite like its mother, and yet the fact of its being in so many thousand ways like its parent is much more wonderful!

If the substance of a germ is able to reproduce what the parental organism acquired during its individual life, how much more will it be able to reproduce what is innate in the parental organism and has been repeated through innumerable generations in the same organized matter of which the germ of to-day, after all, is, and remains but a part. Is it then to be wondered at, that those things which organized matter has experienced on numberless occasions are impressed stronger into the memory of a germ, than the incidents of one single life? Every organic being which lives to-day, is the latest link of an immeasurable series of organic beings, of which one rose into existence from the other, and one inherited part of the acquired properties of the other. The beginning of this series, it must be assumed, are organisms of extremest simplicity like those which are known to us as organic germ cells. In consideration of this, the whole series of such beings appears as the work of the *reproductive faculty* which was inherent in the substance of the first organic form with which the whole development started. When this first germ divided, it bequeathed to its descendants its properties; the immediate descendants added new properties and every new germ reproduced to a great extent the *modi operandi* of its ancestors; part of which grew feebler, because under altered circumstances their reproduction was no longer elicited.

Thus every organized being of our present time is the product of the unconscious memory of organized matter. Constantly increasing and dividing, constantly assimilating new and excreting waste matter, constantly recording new experiences in their memory in order to reproduce it over and over again, it was shaped richer and more perfect the longer it lived.

The whole history of an individual development as observed in a higher organized animal is, from this point of view, a continuous chain of reminiscences of the evolution of all those beings which form the ancestral series of this particular animal. A complicated perception takes place through a volatile, and, as it were, a superficial reproduction of cerebral processes which have been practiced long and carefully; exactly so a growing germ passes quickly and summarily through a series of phases which were developed and fixed, step by step, in the memory of organized matter in the series of its ancestral beings during a life of incalculable duration. This view was preconceived repeatedly; it took shape in various theories, but was rightly understood by one scientist of later days. For truth hides in different shapes before the eyes of its aspirers until it is revealed to the elect.

A body, an organ, or a cell reproduces simultaneously with its shape as well as with its interior and exterior formation, also its functions. A chick which creeps out of its shell at once runs about, as did its mother when she, as a chick, had broken her shell. Imagine how extraordinarily complicated are the motions and sensations of such acts! Only consider the difficulty of equipoising its body in running, and the supposition of an innate reproductive faculty alone, it must be conceded, can serve as an explanation of these intricate performances. The execution of some motion which was exercised during the greatest part of an individual life becomes second nature, and the actions of a whole race which are repeated over and over again by each member of the race must also become second nature.

The chick is not only endowed with an inborn skill concerning its motions, but possesses, also, a strongly developed perceptive faculty. Without hesitation it picks the grains which are thrown to it. This implies that it sees them, that it correctly conceives the direction of their situation and their distance; moreover, it has to move its head and other limbs with great precision. All these things could not be learned in the egg-shell; they have been learned by those many thousands of beings which lived before this chick, and of which it is the direct offspring.

The memory of organized matter is strikingly recognizable in this instance. Such a feeble irritation as the rays produce which proceed from a grain and fall upon

the retina of the chicken, becomes an occasion for the reproduction of a complicated series of sensations, perceptions and motions, which in this individual never as yet had been combined, and which, nevertheless, from the beginning were arranged with accuracy and precision, as if the very same animal had practiced them thousands of times. Such surprising performances of animals are generally called instincts; and some physicists indulged in mystic explanations of instincts. If instinct is considered as the result of memory, or reproductive faculty of organized matter, if we assume that also the race is endowed with memory, instinct is comprehended at once, and the physiologist is enabled to insert instinct into and connect it with the one great series of such facts as were found to be the phenomena of a reproductive faculty. In this way we have not yet gained, but certainly we approach, a physical explanation of the problem.

If, for instance, a caterpillar changes into a chrysalis, or if a bird builds a nest, or a bee constructs a cell, such animals obeying their instincts act with consciousness and are no unconscious machines. They know to some extent how to alter their actions under changed circumstances and are liable to err; they feel pleasure if their work proceeds and displeasure if they meet obstacles. They learn by working, it must be assumed, and birds, no doubt, build their nests better a second time than first. But if animals so easily find the most practical means of attaining their ends the very first time, if their motions are so excellently and perfectly adapted to their purposes, it is due to the inherited tenor of the memory of their nervous substance which only awaits an occasion to work in full conformity with the situation, and remembers just what is necessary for that occasion.

It is striking how easily dexterities are acquired if sufficient limitation is exercised. Onesidedness produces virtuosity. He who admirers a spider for spinning his cobwebs, should bear in mind how limited are his other faculties. Nor should we forget that he did not learn his art himself, it was acquired in slow degrees by innumerable generations of spiders, and this art is almost all they learned. Man takes bow and arrows if his nets fail to catch food, the spider must starve.

Thus the body, it is seen, and what is of greater import, the whole nervous system of a newborn animal is prefigurated and predisposed for its intercourse with the surrounding world into which it enters; it is prepared to respond to irritations and influences in the same way as was done by its ancestors.

We cannot expect that the brain and nervous system of man is an exception from this rule.

Certainly man must learn with difficulty, while the animal from its birth is finished in its instincts; however, the human brain immediately after birth is at a much greater distance from the pitch of its development than the brain of an animal. Its growth not only takes longer time, but is much stronger. The human brain, we may say, is much younger when it enters into the world than the animal brain. The animal is born precocious and at once behaves precociously. It is like a phenomenal child whose brain is overmatured and too old as it were, so as to be unable to develop as richly as does another brain which is less finished and inured to work but fresher and more youthful. The scope for the individual development of the human brain and generally of the human body is much larger because a relatively great part of its development lies in the time after birth. It grows under the influences of its surroundings which affect its senses, and acquires under such circumstances in a more individual way, what an animal has received in the fixed formation of its race.

A far-reaching memory, or reproductive faculty, we must take it as granted, is to be ascribed to the whole body, as well as particularly to the brain of a newborn man. By dint of this memory he is enabled to learn those attainments which were developed in his ancestors some thousand times and are necessary for his life, much quicker and easier. What appears to be instinct in animals, in man appears, in a freer form, as a predisposition. Certainly ideas are not inborn in an infant, but the ability of the ready and precise crystallization of ideas from a complicate mixture of sensations, is due not to the labor of the child, but to the labor of innumerable ancestors.

Theories of individual consciousness, according to which it is assumed that each human soul starts life for itself and commences a development of its own, as if the thousands of generations before had been in existence in vain, are in a striking discord with facts of daily experience.

The realm of those cerebral processes which elevate and distinguish man, it must be conceded, is not of such antiquity as is the province of the more physical necessities. Hunger and procreative impulse have been stirring even the oldest and simplest forms of organic beings. Accordingly organic substance has the most powerful memory for these stimuli, as well as for their satisfaction. The impulses and instincts rising from them take a firm hold even of the man of to-day with elemental power. Spiritual life grows slowly, and its most beautiful blossoms belong to the latest epochs of the evolutionary history of organized matter. It is not yet long that the nervous system is adorned with the ornament of a grand and rich brain.

Oral and written traditions have been called the memory of mankind, and this conception is true. But beside it there is another memory, which is the reproductive faculty of the cerebral substance. Without it, all written and oral language would be empty and meaningless to later generations; for, if the loftiest ideas were

recorded a thousand times in writings or in oral traditions, they would be nothing to such brains as are not predisposed for them. They must not only be received, they must be reproduced. If an increasing cerebral potency were not inherited simultaneously with inner and outer development of brain, with the wealth of ideas which are inherited from generation to generation, if an increased faculty of the reproduction of thoughts did not devolve upon coming generations simultaneously with their oral and written traditions, scripts and languages would be useless.

The conscious memory of man dies with his death; but the unconscious memory of nature is faithful and indestructible. Whoever succeeded to impress the vestiges of his work upon it, will be remembered forever.

PERSONAL IMMORTALITY.

BY DANIEL GREENLEAF THOMPSON.

Is there any sufficient reason for the belief in the continuance of personal mental life after the change we call death? Unless this question is answered in the affirmative, we have no possibility of verifying any hypotheses of a supernatural world nor, indeed, any interest in ascertaining their truth or degree of probability. But assuming that there is such a continuance, we have the possibility, at least, of forming a scientific hypothesis (that is, one capable of verification) in regard to a world beyond.

I make no account of alleged resurrections from the dead nor of oral or written communications claiming to come from a supernatural sphere. Let those believe who can; I do not. And there are plenty of disbelievers as to all these claims. What the world wants to know is, have we scientific evidence upon which to found a rational belief or disbelief upon this question? If the preachers would only turn scientists and come and help us, leaving authority behind them, how admirable it would be! Some of them are trying to do this, God bless them, but the majority are obstructionists.

Now, there are two directions in which the methods of science can be employed with reference to this subject. Both are methods of observation and experiment, principally the former. One is introspective observation of the facts and laws of the human mind, the other is extrinsic observation of what we are accustomed to call the external world. From the latter we get all the knowledge we have of death. What conscious life is we only know by subjective experience. Regarding consciousness introspectively, we find ourselves unable to think even an interruption of consciousness, much less its total and final destruction. It will at once be allowed that the individual cannot remember the time when I was not I. Closer examination reveals that I cannot even suppose a time when I was not, nor am I able to conceive that I can cease to be. To declare either involves a contradiction in my thought. If we had none of the evidence of disappearance and disintegration which is involved in the death of others, we should never have the thought that our conscious mental life could cease, nor even if one were at the point of death would such an idea be possible for him to entertain.

When, however, we look upon the world about us, we see beings seemingly endowed with consciousness like our own. Thus we are compelled to infer and we reason accordingly. In the first place, we notice with all these beings that the signs of conscious life are periodically absent as in sleep, or irregularly suspended as in swoons. Consciousness is interrupted. We even infer this with respect to ourselves by the observation of changes for which we cannot account upon any other supposition. Secondly, we frequently behold an enfeeblement of mental powers, proceeding concomitantly with bodily decay and tending toward a total extinguishment. Memory is often lost, the power of ratiocination likewise and also self-control. Then come the extremes of mania and idiocy. All these diseased conditions indicate diseased conditions of the nervous system. As just pointed out we learn that consciousness can be interrupted. Now we are forced to ask, if mind is progessively impaired as the nervous structure is disintegrated, does not the total disintegration of the latter irresistibly argue the total destruction of the former? And as a matter of fact, when death arrives, the evidences of conscious personality all disappear, the flame goes out and is not relighted. Then follows a complete disintegration of the organized body, in connection with which we knew this personality. We are not able to trace any dissolution of mind, further than just stated, that is, its evidences disappear. Life ceases and with it mind ceases to be manifest to us; the body is disintegrated and the processes of this disintegration we can follow to a considerable extent.

The phenomena of the so-called external world are interpreted by the best scientific intelligence under those laws which have for a nucleus the persistence of force of Mr. Herbert Spencer. Technical physical science having attached a more specific and limited meaning to the term *force*, many would prefer the expression *conservation of energy* to the one above employed. This latter doctrine is that when one kind of energy disappears, energy of some other kind is produced, and that in the transformation, nothing is lost quantitatively; or in words of the other formula, forces are mutually convertible at given rates and in the conversion no force is lost. Involved with this truth are the truths that force is persistent, matter is indestructible and motion is consecutive or persistent. When for instance, the ball strikes the rock the mechanical motion, or some of it, is changed into thermal motion. Mechanical force ceases and heat is evolved. Now, in the progress of scientific knowledge,

we give a name to each definite unanalyzable form of force or energy and assign to it an indestructible reality which we express in such ways as just remarked. We are compelled to do this by the conditions of all knowledge. If, then, mechanical force, A, disappears and energy as heat, B, appears, in the disappearance of A we cannot put it out of existence. We say A and B are correlated; this means that they co-exist and under proper conditions A can be made to reappear. If this were not so, something could become nothing, matter could be destroyed, motion could be annihilated and force would not be persistent. Suppose, then, that the form of organizing energy, which we call life, be indicated by C, while A and B symbolize the mechanical and chemical forces of the inorganic world; if A and B are correlated with C, the conversion of A and B or either of them into C, or of C into A or B, means in the one case the disappearance of A or B and the appearance of C; in the other the converse. When C disappears we cannot by any possibility of thought annihilate it. If it be a distinct reality, it co-exists with A and B, is persistent, abides somehow and somewhere. Then by parity of reasoning, if consciousness is a form of physical energy, D, and is correlated with C, B, A, any or all of them, we have no more power of thinking of its destruction than we have of the destruction of any other form of energy. D disappears, but if in anywise dependent upon C or B, or A, under the laws of persistence or transformation of energy, it still exists. It has disappeared, but under proper conditions it will come back and be manifested as before. So far forth then as consciousness is to be interpreted by the phenomena of the world external to the ego, it must be interpreted by the laws of the conservation of energy and so far forth as explained by those laws it must be held as indestructible. Certainly if consciousness be material, it is forever persistent. The necessity of correlated forces being co-existent has been overlooked by philosophers and scientists.* If force A is transformed into force B, either A still exists, though it has disappeared, and can under appropriate conditions be made to reappear, or an act of annihilation and special creation has been performed as inexplicable as any that theologian ever asserted.

However much information we may derive from a study of the world outside consciousness, it is clear we cannot get along without introspection even in attaining a scientific knowledge of external objects. Indeed, if we reflect carefully, we shall soon find the idea suggesting itself that there are in strictness no "external" objects, but I do not think the use of the term is upon the whole objectionable. At all events, when we come to inquire what constitutes an ultimate form of energy we discover that it is determined entirely by the answer that is given to the question, what are the ultimate modes of sensibility? Heat, we say, is a mode of motion. Motion, however, is understood only with reference to the muscular sense. Certain vibrations there are, to be sure, antecedent to the sensation of warmth; but all the vibrations in the world will not give heat unless there is contact with certain nerves so formed as to develop that sensation. And though we may try to explain heat in terms of motion according to the law of correlation, we can in fact only explain it by itself. It may be produced by material motions, but in last resort, heat is heat and not the sensation of the muscular sense. Similarly with light and with sound. We are in each case driven back to certain ultimate varieties of sensation. And this is our court of last resort.

Our course of investigation thus must needs pass from the material to the mental sphere. Here we at once discover that a state of consciousness is only to be explained by itself in any of its aspects. A feeling is a feeling, a cognition is a cognition. But though each of these is an ultimate and unanalyzable aspect of consciousness, which itself can be resolved into nothing but consciousness, we can observe how states of consciousness are related and propose to ourselves the problem,—How is knowledge possible? One thing is speedily disclosed; that is, there can be no consciousness without representation. It is necessary for perception, even. Equally is it indispensable for all purposes of comparison. A sensation occurs and is followed by another; we are wholly unable to make any comparison between the two without reproducing the first; we can say that B, which is present, is unlike A, which has departed, only representing A in fainter form, *a* for comparison. Memory is everywhere necessary to conscious mental life.

How we know an experience as representative is the mystery of mysteries. Stuart Mill thought it inexplicable and no one has succeeded in resolving the experience into anything more ultimate. How do I know that the cognition *a* is representative of a sensation A, which once occurred to me? How do I know I saw a horse running away while I was walking yesterday? There is no answer save that I remember it. In other words, representative experience is primordial and ultimate, in the same meaning that sensational experience is ultimate.

But see what this involves. It implies not merely a continuity but a unity of personal existence. In recognizing a feeling as the same feeling I had yesterday I have the idea of self present; of self having a feeling yesterday; consciousness of agreement between the two selves and the two feelings. I cannot distinguish the presentations to my mind as having been made before, or in other words, I cannot distinguish a past experience

*Lest the reader may think my ideas upon this point are not the result of sufficient thought, I shall be obliged to ask pardon for referring to my *System of Psychology* (London, 1884), Vol. 1, Chap. XVII, where this whole topic is more fully discussed.

actual, from a simple thought of that experience as possible, except by postulating that the experience actually occurred to *me*—an ego enduring through all change, and itself conditional for all successions.* Thus consciousness universally implies a synthetical unity without whose permanence no coming and going of phenomena in experience can be thought as possible.

The correspondence between the train of presentations and that of representations, or, as the old psychologists used to say, of sensations and ideas, is perfectly well marked. The succession of representative objects is governed by a series of laws similar to those which govern the determination of presentative objects. And these same dicta that force is persistent, matter is indestructible, motion is consecutive, and energy is conserved, find their exact parallel in the science of mind, though there is no power of thought to identify matter with mind, the presentative with the representative. Memory brings these trains of representative objects, each involving a knower, a knowing, and a known. They disappear, but so far forth as they have a distinct unity so as to be objects to consciousness at all, they cannot be thought out of existence. They co-exist with the presentative experiences and when they are thought of, they are, of course, thought of as existent, this thought as just seen postulating personal identity of a present self with a self as existing in the past; and as for a beginning or an end of the series, as before remarked, it is quite impossible to think it.

Thus a reference to mental phenomena, in order to understand material, forces us to a doctrine of the persistence of the individual consciousness. And such a reference appears inevitable. We can have no knowledge of matter, force, motion or energy without representation; and this last is conceded to be purely mental; but it involves persistence of the ego.

It may be well to consider, for a moment, what we mean by destruction. A bird appears in the air before our eyes, and then disappears. We do not say that he is destroyed. On the other hand, when a black beetle is crushed by the foot of the passer-by, and life is extinguished, followed by complete disintegration of structure, we speak of the destruction of the insect. But, even in this case, as we are accustomed to reason, we do not allow that the *matter* composing the insect's organism is destroyed. Dust it was, and to dust it simply returns. What, then, is destroyed? The form, if you please; the something that made the beetle what it was, the life is gone. Gone to be sure; but how are we going to annihilate life any more than the particles of dust? And in view of what we have just been noticing in regard to representation, how is it possible that the form, the mental element, shall be destroyed either? So far forth as this insect is composed of particles of matter, so far forth as its life is force or energy, its destruction is unthinkable. So far forth as its form is concerned, this being merely the mental apprehension of a subjective combining power, which is itself indestructible, we are unable to find destruction there; for we cannot think anything into nothing. It would thus seem that the disintegration, which we are wont to call destruction, is, after all, nothing but disappearance. We may not in experience meet with a reappearance, but we are bound to consider it, not only as possible, but as inevitable under appropriate conditions. In other words, what once *was*, *is*, somehow or somewhere and does not pass into nothingness.

Then it must be asked, how does it happen that if we cannot think of anything becoming annihilated people are all the while seemingly doing so, and there exists a necessity of argument to show their error? How come we to have the idea of something becoming nothing? A vacuum may be an impossibility, but how then have we the notion of a vacuum? The answer is found in the Universal Paradox of Knowledge—a paradox which is nevertheless the foundation of all cognition. Every positive implies a negative, which can only be thought in positive terms, which excludes the positive and is excluded from it but whose existence is equally necessary with that of the positive. The existence of the negative is conditional for the reality of the positive. For every A there is a not-A; for every finite an infinite; for every known an unknown. This truth is constantly lost sight of. Mistaken notions as to space are largely responsible for this; space is given in sensation as much as force, space and force being correlative sensations; space is a reality as much as is force. Similar errors are made with regard to time; duration is not considered, the attention of thinkers being concentrated upon succession. The reality and the certainty of unconscious mind are conditional for conscious mind. If this were not so, we should never be able to say that we have forgotten anything. By reason of this paradox, we are compelled to aver that a vacuum is a thing as much as a plenum; the former exists as much as the latter. But in the process of generalization, we make a universal "all things," which excludes "vacuum," but in this very exclusion we imply reality and positiveness in the latter. "Nothing" is the negative which is left in the mind when generalization and integration are carried to their farthest point. When, therefore, we say that something is nothing, we indeed contradict ourselves, since in forming the notion "something" we already exclude it from "nothing;" and when we declare that a "vacuum" exists, we seek to include it within a class of objects which have in their idea excluded it. But, nevertheless, we cannot get rid of the conclusion that when we have found our universal concept inclusive of everything there is still a something

System of Psychology, Chap. IX.

real and positive beyond. Thus when we declare that something has become annihilated, all we can mean is that it has passed from the perceptible into the imperceptible. When we propose to annihilate anything we can chase it away, and away, and away, till our mind gets tired; but the moment we stop, as stop we must, it is there at the end mocking us. To think a "vacuum" is thus an impossibility as a process of endless centrifugal mental motion. But if we mean by annihilation a disappearance, which is all that can be meant, it is possible to conceive of it. This is not, however, the meaning of terms as usually employed. They refer to this endless motion, and the conditions of logical thought necessitate this universal paradox.

The truth is we are forced by the laws of cognition to postulate an unknown reality behind the known reality, both of matter and mind, a dark side of the material world and of intelligence, an imperceptible substantive being, out of which somehow comes the perceptible, and into which it disappears, a source of both material and mental phenomena, a cause of their effects, a permanent in which alone change is possible, a possibility for all actualities and a power which transcends knowledge but which is presupposed in all knowledge. This is the meaning of the paradox.

The lines of argument as to the question of personal immortality thus converge. Whether we look without or within the mind, we come to substantially the same result. If conscious mind be a higher force superinduced upon the vital energies, then we must believe in conscious existence after death. If force be persistent, if energy be conserved, if motion is continuous, if matter is indestructible, then the conscious ego is indestructible, the mental processes are continuous, the power of apperception is conserved and persistent. On the other hand, if we look introspectively, we find it impossible to think even of an interruption of consciousness, while all the considerations derived from an observation of external nature have increased strength when we consider the trains of states of consciousness as mental objects. The conscious ego persists—that is the self-conscious ego—the knowing, feeling, willing ego, for we know no other. That is what mind means.

It is no harder to understand the continued existence of personal existence after death than to comprehend its occultation in sleep and restoration afterward. As before said, the sleeper knows, subjectively, no interruption; he infers it from changes in his environment. Its occurrence, however, is quite inexplicable; yet no one speaks of any impairment of personal identity because of it.

The greatest perplexity arises, perhaps, over the fact of the failure of memory. Without memory there is no personal consciousness, and we often observe a progressive impairment of the representative power. Memory waxes and wanes according to bodily conditions. If, then, alterations of the nerve-structure in disease will abrogate memory, the total disintegration of that structure, it may be said, will remove the possibility of representation—at any rate until some re-integration takes place. If, while life continues mind may fail, how much more when life is extinguished must we be compelled to the belief that the individual consciousness has irrecoverably passed away. But, after all, this deterioration of memory is only concomitant with degeneration of vitality. Vital force wanes and, perhaps, there may be by-and-by just this reintegration of which we spoke. Vital force, though it has disappeared, exists somewhere. There may be a lacuna in conscious existence as in sleep; but do not the considerations before adduced impel us to the belief that there may be an awakening even after death to the conscious identity which says I am I, I was and I am?

On every side, from beginning to end, this subject is beset with difficulties; but altogether I am inclined to the opinion that the ground for the assertion of post-mortem personal self-consciousness in identity with ante-mortem self-consciousness is firmer than for the contrary belief.

But one thing more ought to be said before we close. The same arguments that support the belief in continued personal existence after death tend also to prove an existence before birth. Is it possible that we must return to the pre-existence doctrines of the ancient philosophers? Is it possible that we must each say, I am; therefore I always was and always shall be? *Dios sabe!*

Is it wonderful, in view of all these things, that mankind clings to the belief that the inquiry raised by intelligence must be answerable to intelligence, that some conscious being somewhere, at some time or somehow must understand these mysteries; or that they voice the song of Omar Khayyam—

"We are no other than a moving row
Of magic shadow shapes that come and go
Round with the sun-illuminated lantern held
In midnight by the master of the show.

But helpless pieces of the game he plays
Upon this chequer board of nights and days;
H ther and thither moves, and checks, and slays,
And one by one back in the closet lays.

The ball no question makes of ayes and noes,
But here or there as strikes the player goes;
And he that toss'd you down into the field
He knows about it all—he knows—HE knows!"

JAILS AND JUBILEES.

BY ELIZABETH CADY STANTON.

The two questions just now agitating Great Britain are "Coercion" for Ireland, and the Queen's Jubilee—a tragedy and a comedy in the same hour.

The former is being hotly discussed in Parliament and by thoughtful people at every fireside. As the

English are by no means of one opinion on this question, the excitement and bitterness among contending factions, in public and private, remind one of the old days of slavery in the United States, when families, as well as churches and political parties, were rent in twain by the agitation. There has been so much said and written in regard to the condition of Ireland, that your readers need no recapitulation of the successive steps of tyrannical legislation, by which, through four centuries, England has at last completely subjugated a nation that was at one time the light of European civilization.

Down to the sixteenth century, Ireland, in her system of education and jurisprudence, was pre-eminently the great center of progress and learning. To her free schools and universities students flocked from every part of Christendom, and Irish teachers and professors spread throughout the known world. "The body of her laws," says one of her historians, "revised and codified, is now, by order of the British government, being translated and published as a rare and valuable treasury of ancient jurisprudence, Parliament making an annual grant for that purpose since 1852."

But alas! her glory has departed. All the solemn treaties made by England, when Ireland consented to a union, have one after another been violated; her manufactories, by direct legislation, have been ruthlessly destroyed; the education of her children made a penal offense; her lands confiscated; her troops disbanded, and hated rulers set over her—Governors, Chief Secretaries, Constabulary, Police—all appointed by the English government, with a standing army of 25,000 soldiers to enforce obedience to these officers, all of which the Irish people are taxed to support. Thus, by degrees, has England made Ireland what she is to-day, a helpless, beggared, dependency. Though too crippled in her resources to make open war, her national cry is still the same as it ever has been, and ever will be: "Give us liberty or death." Death she has had in many forms but for centuries not one taste of liberty.

The discontent of this oppressed people has been voiced from time to time, by Grattan, Curran, Emmet, Burke, O'Connell—all far-seeing statesmen and gifted orators—but what avail unanswerable arguments based on the eternal principles of justice, wit, wisdom, eloquence, when weighed in the balance with the greed, selfishness and tyranny of the English government.

And now a Tory ministry proposes to give the last turn of the screw in a Coercion Act, that, if passed during this session of Parliament, will reduce the Irish nation to hopeless slavery. This bill, depriving the people of trial by jury; of the freedom of the press and of speech; of the right to hold public meetings—in fact, making football of all their civil and political liberties, is a disgrace to the age in which we live, and should be publicly and officially denounced by every civilized nation. Americans on this side the water are proud to learn that public meetings, with Governors of the several States in the chair, are being held in our country to protest against any further outrages on this long suffering people. While England boasts of being a Christian and civilized nation, in all her dealings with foreign countries she has proved herself the most brutal government on the face of the earth. She has ever been quick to point the slow, unwavering finger of scorn at oppressions in other lands,—let all nations now make a united effort to open her eyes to her own slavery in Ireland. She is to-day subsidizing the wealth of the world, as far as she can to support her army, navy and established church; her royal family, nobility and petty county grades of aristocracy; her system of land tenure, tithes, taxes and corrupt social customs; her increasing pauperism and crime, grinding the last farthing from her subjects everywhere to maintain a show of state at home.

In this supreme moment of the nation's political crisis the Queen and her suite are junketing round in their royal yachts on the coast of France, while proposing to celebrate her year of Jubilee by levying new taxes on her people, in the form of penny and pound contributions to build a monument to Prince Albert, who never uttered one lofty sentiment or performed one deed of heroism, if fairly represented on the page of history. The year of Jubilee! while under the eyes of the Queen her Irish subjects are being evicted from their holdings at the point of the bayonet; their cottages burned to the ground; aged and helpless men and women and newborn children, alike left crouching on the highways, under bridges, hayricks and hedges, crowded into poor-houses, jails and prisons, to expiate the crimes growing out of poverty on the one hand, and patriotism on the other.

While the Queen has laid up for herself and her innumerable progeny ten millions of pounds during the last fifty years, the condition of the laboring classes in Great Britain has been growing steadily worse; for what then should the gratitude of the people take an enduring form of expression in a Parian marble monument to her consort?

A far more fitting way to celebrate the year of Jubilee would be for the Queen to scatter the millions hoarded in her private vaults among her needy subjects, to mitigate, in some measure, the miseries they have endured from generation to generation; to inaugurate some grand improvement in her system of education; to extend still further the civil and political rights of her people; to suggest, perchance, an Inviolable Homestead Bill for Ireland, and to open the prison doors to her noble priests and patriots.

But instead of such worthy ambitions, in the fiftieth year of her reign, what does the Queen propose?

With her knowledge and consent, committees of ladies are formed in every county, town and village in all the colonies under her flag, to solicit these penny and pound contributions, to be placed at her disposal. Ladies go from house to house, not only to the residences of the rich, but the cottages of the poor, through all the marts of trade, the fields, the factories, begging pennies for the Queen from servants and day-laborers. One called at the door of an American lady a few days since, and asked of the maid who opened the door, to see the servants. After wheedling them out of a few pence, she asked for the mistress, hoping to obtain from her a pound at least, but she being an American and a republican declined giving a donation, on the ground that the Queen having amassed a vast fortune of ten millions of pounds, was abundantly able to erect a monument to Prince Albert herself. She thought it would be more suitable if the Queen gave a Jubilee offering to her people rather than they to her.

"But," urged the lady beggar, "it will rouse good feeling among the people to take some part in this commemoration." "Why should there be good feeling?" said the American. "For fifty years the poor of England have been taxed heavily to support Her Majesty and to make marriage settlements on all her children, and while she has been growing richer and richer they have been steadily growing poorer and poorer." The ladies who started this woman's fund intended it should all come back to the people in the form of charity. Great regret was felt by them when they learned that Her Majesty intended to erect a monument. The complaints became so loud that at the Queen's commands the ladies were informed by Mr. Ponsonby that only £1,500 would be expended in that way and the remainder would be devoted to charity. It is evident royalty is looking for a most generous outpouring by the people.

To show how little idea the people have as to the sentiment and æsthetic taste involved in this proposed work of art, one poor woman when asked to give a penny to the fund, said "here, Miss, take two, sure I've known what it is to want myself sometimes." Another needy widow said, "Oh, yes, I can spare a penny for the Queen. A widdy with a large family must have a great struggle to make the ends meet." Many such stories are repeated with peals of laughter. But who that has a soul to feel could receive money from the hard hand of poverty, and under such false pretenses. Instead of making merry over such misplaced generosity, public indignation should be roused against those who receive it.

To be sure the queen has had a long reign, but what great national work or what new liberty for her people has ever emanated from her brain? Her influence, as far as she has had any, has been against all change and improvement. If the crowned heads of Europe were to make a present to the Queen and build two monuments, both to her and her consort, it would be highly suitable. For one of their number to stick to a throne for fifty years in this revolutionary period is indeed remarkable.

But as her name has never been connected with any progressive movement, why ask gifts from the people? Through the troubled times of the great unemployed, and the prolonged Irish struggle, the country has only heard of her in connection with one democratic demonstration. She attended a private representation of that popular Parisian circus, in London, and it was recorded in all the papers that Her Majesty was delighted with the exhibition and honored the baby elephant by caressing his left ear.

The idea of a penny from the masses is a nice point in English calculations. When they established their system of free schools they passed a cunning little by-law, requiring each child to come with a penny in its hand, ofttimes with its little stomach so empty that the brain could not work. Think of the self-control the child must have exercised in passing a bake-shop with a penny in its hand! A humane teacher told me she was obliged to take the penny, but she usually gave the children that needed it a roll of bread, which she purchased for that purpose on her way to school. To rescind this by-law and establish a bread fund for hungry children in the schools would be a good use to make of the Jubilee pennies filched from the poor, but to build a monument on such a basis is enough to make Prince Albert turn in his grave.

London, April.

CHATS WITH A CHIMPANZEE.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

Part III.

"I am eager to know the ways and means of your evolutional pilgrimage to humanity and thence to reversionary monkeyhood."

So I said when next presenting myself, girt with sacred flowers, before my sage of the monkey temple at Benares. No sooner was my query put than from the blood-stained pavement outside came a vulgar English voice, crying: "In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the word was God." Here there were confused voices, and the next sound was the canting reader again—"Without Him was not anything made that was made. In Him was life; and the life was the light of men; and the light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not." (Noise.) "My dear hearers, and you, ye poor deluded idolators, this is the blessed Trinity, three persons in one God—" (Tinkle, tinkle!)

I knew well the meaning of the musical tinkle. Some procession was bearing a god or goddess on its

ceremonial round, had paused before an altar and begun the instrumentation for a sacred dance. I moved away to an aperture in the wall and saw the nautch girls just beginning to dance before a grim but gaudy god throned in his sedan beneath a cobra canopy. Near by stood a white-robed and turbaned cockney with his little cohort of Salvationists.

"In the name of Almighty God stop that idolatry and blasphemy, or the plagues of ——"

A sharp official voice reprimanding, cut short the sentence of the Salvationist, who was pale and trembling.

"Sing, sisters!" he cried.

In a moment the tinklings of the sacred triangles were drowned by a dozen shrill voices wailing of the "Sweet By-and-By." In an instant two powerful Hindus darted forward, seized the foolhardy Salvationist and rolled him in the wet blood of sacrified kids. The English women shrieked, the Hindus yelled, and a fight began which might have ended seriously had not the police appeared and marched the Salvationists off, followed by the two Brahmans who had assailed him. When I turned back into the court of the temple I saw a hundred monkeys seated quietly along the parapet overlooking the street and gazing with silent interest on the crowd beneath. When the human companies which came into collision had departed the monkeys slowly distributed themselves, and my friendly chimpanzee descended.

"Those poor Christians and Brahmans did not understand each other," he remarked. "If they had understood each other they would have embraced instead of fighting. There was no real difference between the god in the sedan and the god in whose name the Christian forbade the other's rites. But I am puzzled that a man should in one breath utter wisdom and in another show himself a fool. When he said of his god, 'without him was not anything made that was made,' why should he be furious against these divine manufactures in India?"

"Ah, he didn't say that himself; he said it as a parrot says what it is told, without understanding it."

"He is then an illustration of the words, 'the light shineth in the darkness, the darkness comprehends it not,' for surely he uttered wise sentences."

"Well, let us leave the poor fellow now, for I am anxious to hear about your evolutionary method."

"'In the beginning was the word.' That is the key of creation. There is no beginning beyond the beginning of language. In the first silent intercourse between living forms, grassblade's signal to grassblade, flower blushing to flower, and back of these to the faint infinitesimal communications which, through the *kalpas* (or *æons*, you might say) led up to them."

"Some tell us that the dumb inorganic universe—the mineral, the worlds and stars—must have had a beginning."

"In a sense, no doubt. I hurl this round cake against that wall—thus! You observe those doves picking up the crumbs. Each crumb has just had a beginning. The sun once hurled into space a cosmical cake which has broken up into worlds. Perhaps the sun itself was a crumb of a previous cake, perhaps not. There is no absolute beginning in these changes."

"Then you would find the beginning in the appearance of life on our planet."

"'In the beginning was the word,' as the pious parrot said. Without language was not anything made that was made. The living germ was not made."

"Some of our scientists say life was evolved out of matter; that the inorganic evolved the organic."

"I recognize the idea as a phase of thought through which our anthropoid race passed. In recoil from a primitive and fictitious system which assumed millions of causes for phenomena only superficially different, we went to the other extreme and confused antagonistic phenomena in a unity so unnatural that it had to be made supernatural. Why should not life be an original mode of one thing as well as lifelessness that of another? Why—except by some theological or metaphysical assumption—should we say that organic and inorganic are not equally eternal, in their several essence, and equally without beginning?"

"It has been said the phenomenal universe implies a cause, because every effect implies a cause."

"But it is an assumption that the universe is an effect. It exists. No man has ever shown that it had any beginning — neither its inorganic atoms or its organic germs. There is live stuff and lifeless stuff. The lifeless stuff runs through certain changes, chemic, molecular and other; the living stuff through certain other changes, growth, decay; the two are found combined and mutually modified in many forms. Thus it always was, so far as anybody has shown."

"And always will be?"

"That does not follow. It were mere speculation to inquire. The thing in which I suppose you to be interested is the beginning and process of creation—that is the various development of life-stuff in this world."

"It is just that I wish to know."

"Well, I can only tell you about the particular road I have traveled. It is not necessary to suppose that all forms have traveled by one route. As it is not necessary to suppose that granite was evolved from flint, flint from water, water from salt, neither is it necessary to suppose that whales, crabs, butterflies, tigers, have been evolved from each other."

"Such variety is not admitted by Western science."

"Perhaps because an ancient deism survives in it as a suffocating unity. What reason is there to believe that our cherries were once plums, or the reverse? Amid the innumerable myriads of atoms and germs floating

through infinite space through infinite time, cohering, crumbling, combining under various chemic influences, the molecules assume varied shapes, the life-germs varied potencies; and while the inorganic world subsists in endless shapes, the seeds grow into many forms and flavors. A mouse is not evolved from the same ancestor as the adder that preys on it, any more than a diamond from an opal,—at least such is my opinion. Were it proved that mouse is evolved from adder it would be interesting, as it is to a philologist that your word 'adder' is evolved from our Hindu demon 'Ahi,' but it would not affect the principle of evolution."

"It is, as you suggest, a detail."

"Very well. Now we may consider the line of human evolution without being entangled in other questions. But, lest I take up your time by repeating what you already know, let me ask you whether your thought has been directed to the consideration of language as a factor of physical evolution?"

"Yes, by a great master to whom I have listened—Huxley. In one lecture, long ago, he spoke on this subject in a way which I often hoped he would follow up. He illustrated the vast change of function which may follow a minutest change of form, by showing how slight a pressure of pincers on the hand-rivet of a watch may stop it. The register of the solar system becomes and idle box of metal. The minute modification of form would make a functional change quite infinite. This he applied to the minute difference in the vocal chords between a speaking and speechless animal. And it is language, he said, that makes man what he is; language, giving him the means of recording his experience, making every generation wiser than its predecessor, more in accordance with the established order of the universe. It is speech which enables men to be men—looking before and after, and, in some dim sense, understanding the workings of the universe,—distinguishing man from the brute world. This functional difference, so infinite in its consequences, may depend on structural differences absolutely inappreciable by our present means of investigation. Were you to alter in the minutest degree the proportion of the nervous forces now active in the two nerves which supply the muscles of my glottis, I who now speak, should become suddenly dumb. The voice is produced only so long as the vocal chords are parallel; and these are parallel only so long as certain muscles contract with exact equality; and that again depends on the equality of action of the two nerves referred to. So that a change of the minutest kind in the structure of one of these nerves, or of the part in which it originates, or of the supply of food to that part, or of one of the muscles to which it is distributed, might render us all dumb. But a race of dumb men, deprived of all communication with those who could speak, would be little indeed removed from the brutes. The moral and intellectual difference between them and ourselves would be practically infinite, though the naturalist should not be able to find even a single shadow of specific structural difference. So spake the professor."

"So much then you know. These are pregnant testimonies from the human point of view. When we meet again I shall have something to add from the anthropoid standpoint. The hour has arrived when I must go and receive some sacrificial offerings. See, my worshipers already begin to kneel!"

I asked him whether there would be found any appreciable difference between the vocal apparatus of a fine opera singer and that of one who could not sing. He replied that a naturalist might, perhaps, detect such difference, as a violinist might detect between a Cremona and ordinary violin of the same size. I once put a similar question to Dr. Carpenter, who said that the billionth of an inch may measure the difference between the chatter of a monkey and the song of a Patti. Darwin indeed, wondered that some apes do not talk. Schleicher holds that monkeys and men are both descended from the same anthropoid race, now extinct; those that acquired language developed into humanity, those that failed to gain speech deteriorated into our present monkeys.

THE FREE RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION AND ITS APPROACHING ANNUAL MEETING.

BY WM. J. POTTER.

The Free Religious Association has been in existence twenty years. It will hold its twentieth anniversary in Boston on the 26th and 27th of the present month. This meeting promises to be one of exceptional interest and importance. It will have a special interest, not only as bringing together a large number of able and attractive speakers, but as involving, in the discussions proposed, both the retrospective and prospective points of view. It will have a special importance as determining, perhaps, the future of the Association.

The Free Religious Association has a unique history. There had never been anything like it before in this country, there has never been anything like it in any other country. It is, perhaps, owing to this uniqueness of character, if the Association has not fulfilled all the expectations which any persons may have had with regard to it at the time of its organization. The organization was designedly made of the loosest type possible,—the farthest removed from anything of an ecclesiastical nature, though intended to affect all ecclesiastical structures. It had no set of doctrines to promulgate, it established no fixed machinery for carrying out a certain definite scheme of work. It simply had certain ideas and principles by which its organizers hoped to impress and gradually shape public opinion; and for this end, they trusted chiefly to the public meeting, the lecture

and the printing-press. They left the organization itself free to be shaped by the growth and progress of the ideas and principles which it embodied.

There are, probably, not a few readers of THE OPEN COURT who remember well that first public meeting in Horticultural Hall, Boston, at which the Association was formed. Those who prepared for that meeting and felt the profoundest interest in it could not themselves foresee what would be the result. At the several preliminary private conferences which had been held, of persons interested in the application of the freest thought to religious questions, there had been a difference of opinion in respect to organizing. One of these meetings, held at the house of Dr. Bartol, was a most notable gathering. It was attended by some sixty persons or more, who had been specially invited to consider the question. The discussion was able, earnest, frank, and continued the greater part of the day. Some of the special utterances of that occasion still linger in my ears word for word. With very few exceptions the meeting consisted of those who were of Unitarian affiliations or antecedents. This came to pass, because the occasion which had started the question of a new organization had been given by the action of the National Unitarian Conference, in putting into the preamble of its constitution certain theological phrases against which a minority had earnestly protested. Yet it cannot be said that the voice of this meeting was in favor of organization. It was a divided voice. Some of the ablest and most influential of those who spoke on the question were opposed to organized action. Some of the most radical members of the meeting, though deprecating the Unitarian proceedings and feeling themselves excluded from the National Conference, were averse to any other kind of organization than that of the individual society. Though the result of the meeting was the appointment of a committee to present the same question at a public meeting, to be called and arranged for by them, it can only be said that this conclusion was rather conceded tacitly as a right to those who favored organization than advocated or voted for by a very considerable number of those present. Even that committee became partially dissolved before the time of the public meeting came. It was, therefore, not at all clear what would be the issue of the public step nor whether many people would respond to the call.

In view of these facts, the committee ventured to secure a hall of only moderate size. The Boston Horticultural Hall is estimated to seat an audience of a thousand. Considerably before the hour advertised for the meeting the seats were all taken, and people were beginning to stand in the aisles; and when the committee, a little before the time, reached the hall, they were told that they could not get through the crowded mass of human beings from the front, but must get to the platform from the rear. This packed assembly, occupying every seat and all the standing room and extending out into the vestibule, remained through the greater part of the long morning session. The public notice to which this gathering was the response was very simple. It ran as follows: "A public meeting, to consider the conditions, wants and prospects of Free Religion in America, will be held on Thursday, May 30, at 10 A. M., at Horticultural Hall, Boston." Appended to this was the announcement that R. W. Emerson, John Weiss, Robert Dale Owen, Wm. H. Furness, Lucretia Mott, Henry Blanchard, T. W. Higginson, D. A. Wasson, Isaac M. Wise, Oliver Johnson, F. E. Abbot and Max Lilienthal had been asked to address the meeting, and that addresses might "be expected from most of them." The notice was signed by "O. B. Frothingham, Wm. J. Potter, Rowland Connor, Committee."

It must be remembered that the term "Free Religion" used in this call had not then become the specific appellation which it is now. It simply had the general meaning of religion emancipated from every kind of thrall. It will be noticed, too, that the movement had already passed beyond the boundaries of denominational Unitarianism. Mr. Connor, of the Committee, was then the colleague of Dr. Miner, as junior pastor of the First Universalist Church in Boston. It may here be added that his affiliation with the Free Religious movement cost him his position in that church and denomination. Of the invited speakers, Mr. Blanchard also represented progressive Universalism; Messrs. Wise and Lilienthal were Jewish Rabbis; Lucretia Mott was the well-known and venerated preacher of the liberal division of the Society of Friends; Mr. Owen was a leading light among the Spiritualists; Oliver Johnson represented the Progressive Friends. The others, though they were or had been connected with the Unitarians, were either already doing their work independently of any denominational standing or held their denominational positions of less account than their regard for liberty of religious thought. The actual speakers and the order in which they spoke, were, O. B. Frothingham, who presided, Mr. Blanchard, Mrs. Mott, Mr. Owen, Mr. Weiss, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Abbot, Mr. Wasson, Mr. Higginson and Mr. Emerson. Mr. Emerson had sat in the body of the hall throughout the meeting, unobserved from the platform, and began his remarks by saying that he hardly felt that he had come to the right hall when he found the house so full of people; that he had expected a committee meeting rather than such an audience. He showed that he was deeply interested in the occasion, and at the afternoon session, when a constitution was adopted and organization was effected, he gave a proof of this interest in a way unusual with him. Though not commonly working with organizations nor joining their membership, he was among the first to come forward to have his name

enrolled on the list of members. In the Executive Committee appointed, following the adoption of the constitution, Unitarianism, Quakerism, Spiritualism, Universalism, Judaism, were all represented, as well as that large realm of rational thought and humanitarian activity outside of all denominational lines.

It is not my purpose here to trace the history of the Free Religious Association during the twenty years of its existence. But I wish to say this: no one can rightly comprehend that history without taking into account these circumstances of the origin of the Association to which I have referred and without noting especially the variety and diversity of elements that made its constituency. If any persons were expecting that this new religious movement would set up the machinery of an active propagandism corresponding to the activity of an ecclesiastical sect—would become, perhaps, itself a new and advanced religious sect—organizing local societies, sending out preachers and lecturers, etc., they were doomed to disappointment, though in the latter particular one or two attempts have been made. It was not to be supposed that the venerable Lucretia Mott would leave the Quaker meeting-house, where after many struggles she had won for herself rational liberty, to join a local "Free Religous" society, should one have been established in her neighborhood; nor that Rabbi Wise, who was one of the first Directors of the Association, would abandon his synagogue to become a lecturer for "Free Religion" as something distinct from the rational ideas and advancing thought which he believed to be embodied in progressive Judaism. Indeed, the constitution of the Free Religious Association expressly declared from the outset that membership there should "affect in no degree [a member's] relation to other associations." By this clause it was evidently intended to declare that the new movement was not to be necessarily a secession from existing religious bodies, or a new body competing with the old in the same general field. It was to do its work in a different way for different ends. And, again, if the Association has not done all that some of its members hoped it would do, and even now believe it might have done, in the field marked out by its own constitution, and especially in promoting certain definite ethical and philanthropic activities, the reason may again be found in the fact of its various and scattered constituency, its members being already engaged more or less in activities of this sort wherever they might be located. In fine, the nature of the organization was of too broad a type to permit, to much extent, other methods of practical work than those adapted to create and shape public opinion, and to inspire the members individually to do the utmost in their power for promoting the objects of the Association in their respective localities and spheres of labor. The work of the Association has been done, therefore, through the public convention, the lecture-platform and the printing-press.

On account of the variety of religious and philosophical beliefs appearing on its platform and to be found in its membership, it has sometimes been said that the Free Religious Association is merely a free parliament for the expression of all opinions on the subjects presented for discussion. But this is a most superficial view of the significance of the Association. It is true that all honest opinions on religious and ethical questions, all varieties of view, have been welcomed on its platform. It is also true that there is great diversity of religious belief among its members, and that the constitution expressly declares that no "test of speculative opinion or belief" shall debar from membership. Yet, through the same constitution, the members do affirm certain very important things together, which gives them a very distinct significance as a religious organization. For one thing they affirm unrestricted mental liberty as the essential condition of their fellowship, as of all true and progressive religious thinking; and then, in the statement of the objects or purposes of the Association, they affirm that all questions of religion and ethics are to be studied by the free reason, according to the methods of modern science, and not under the supervision of ecclesiastical authority; that fellowship is to be determined not by ties of sect or creed, nor even by the Christian boundary, but by humanitarian and spiritual affiliations; and that, of all the so-called interests of religion, morality, the pure character, the upright life, are of vastly more importance than any sectarian prosperity or the creed of any church. I have here somewhat paraphrased the succinct statement of objects as they have stood from the beginning in the constitution of the Association. Certain amendments of phraseology have been made from time to time, not, in my opinion, changing the original essential meaning, but only trying to express it more clearly. Whatever else the members of the Association may have had to say concerning religion, and in connection with whatever other organizations they may have found freedom and opportunity for work, in this constitution they have affirmed together these four positive propositions.

Now, these four affirmations are very momentous. Were they ever affirmed together before by any kind of religious organization on the globe? If they were to be generally acted upon they would revolutionize the religious world. But they are not to take effect by any violent action. They are sure to grow in favor, they are growing in favor; but the change is to be a gradual process,—an evolution. The evolution is already in progress in many churches and denominations, and even in the religions of the world. Every one of these great affirmations has made an important advance in the last twenty years. Various agencies have been helping toward this end; but it may be rightly claimed that the Free Religious Association, as a pioneer society in presenting and holding these ideas before the public, has

had a good share in effecting this result. Mental liberty; character before creed; fellowship in spirit rather than by the letter of a creed or by any religious name; reason, acting freely, the arbiter in religious questions rather than ecclesiastical authority,—these several ideas are all receiving greater recognition, certainly, than twenty years ago, and are beginning to permeate churches and sects with their growing power.

Of course, the great work is by no means yet accomplished. But, in the changed condition of things, the question may be raised whether the time has not come for a reconstruction of the Free Religious organization with a view to adopting more definite and concentrated methods of working for its objects. The new times may have brought new demands; opened fields for labor, perhaps, of a somewhat different kind; matured, possibly, the conditions of a larger opportunity. It is well, therefore, that the approaching twentieth anniversary meeting should take up this question, and this it is proposed to do. That meeting in 1867 was called "to consider the conditions, wants and prospects of Free Religion in America." So let the meeting that is to be held in Tremont Temple, Boston, on the 27th of May, consider the conditions, wants and prospects of emancipated religion in America at this present time. What is the duty of the present hour? What are the wants in this year of 1887? And how can the Free Religious Association meet them? Possibly an entirely new organization is demanded. If so, and this fact were made clear, the Free Religious Association, if true to its own soul, would not cumber the ground to the detriment of another organization that could now better do its work. It is not to this or that form of organization that the genuine devotee of free religion adheres. It is principles and ideas that hold his allegiance; it is the advance of principles and ideas that he craves.

ETHICS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS.

BY M. M. TRUMBULL.

If the problem of poverty is to be solved in any rational and effective way, we must bring American politics under the dominion of ethics. Ethics must become an active governing power as well as a passive code. It must superintend the work of all our magistrates and require that every act of statesmanship shall rest upon a moral foundation. It must compel the law to apportion our civil burdens fairly, so that no part of the public taxes shall be a dead weight upon industry, pressing the laborer down to a lower plane of life. It is not enough that ethics control our private conduct, it must also direct our public acts and deeds. So long as our politicians can exclude ethics from public affairs and limit its authority to matters of personal character only, so long the statutes of the land will be made for private gain, and so long we shall compete with one another for a share in the profits of wrong.

The reckless making of public debts and their preservation for private advantage, add greatly to the oppression of industry. It is not well for labor when important private interests depend for their prosperity on the increase and preservation of public debt. It is bad for honest business when those debts are converted into capital for the rich, into usury and taxation for the poor. The pressure of public debt squeezes a portion of the useful classes from every layer of society to the tier immediately below, and when it reaches those who are just able to balance income and expenses, it crowds a portion of them into the pit of destitution. Our public debts amount to about $2,200,000,000 and they bear interest at the average rate of about 5 per cent. per annum. This is not a very oppressive debt, we say, for a nation that earns ten thousand millions a year. True enough, but if the burden of it be inequitably adjusted it may cause much poverty in the ranks of those who have to bear it. Many of the local debts have been incurred by jobbery of little or no value to the municipalities involved. They were sown in corruption, they must be raised in incorruption, that is to say, they must be honestly paid, and that payment must come out of the proceeds of useful industry. Mr. Blaine, speaking of these debts at Oshkosh a few years ago, said: "I venture the assertion based on some scrutiny into facts that there has not been realized on the average fifty cents of palpable, permanent value for each dollar raised and expended."

The interest on those debts, to say nothing of the running cost of government, is a drain upon industry that never stops. It is perpetually calling for taxation, and crafty men have shaped the law and practice of impost and assessment in such an ingenious way that the "incidence" of them strikes most heavily upon the laboring man, the clerk, the cottage owner, the small manufacturer, and the merchant of limited means. Such facilities have rich men for undervaluing their property and concealing it, that the rate of taxation in proportion to personal wealth grows lighter and lighter as we ascend, until by the time we reach the man of ten millions it amounts to comparatively nothing. The man whose worldly wealth consists of a little cottage worth a thousand dollars cannot conceal it; he is assessed in full, while the man who owns a million dollars is generally assessed at about $50,000, or one-twentieth of the real value of his property. This is not a guess; it is an actual estimate made from a comparison of the assessor's books, with the records of the Probate Court. In the spring the rich man lists his property to the assessor at seventy thousand dollars; he dies in the summer, and his executors then swear in the Probate Court that its value amounts to two million, five hundred thousand dollars. This is not an imaginary case. It is an actual example taken from the records, a vivid illustration of loyalty to

the law of "self-preservation" in this world, while a prudent insurance against accidents in the next world is disclosed by the reading of the will, which contains a liberal bequest to the church of which our departed brother was an honored and consistent member.

Consistent, indeed, he was. For twenty years he had "worshiped" in a costly temple exempt from taxation, a church, which not only cast the public burdens from its own shoulders on to those of honest industry, but had also entered into a partnership with all other churches to enable them to go and do likewise. In this bad "combine," the partners rise above sectarianism. On this low plane all are orthodox. Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian, Catholic, Jew, all assist each other to evade their duty to the State. Though each believes the other's teaching false, and much of it pernicious, yet each claims tax exemption for the rest on the ground that their false teachings have a virtuous public influence. Our departed brother had only followed the example set him by his church. He had learned from its practice that ethics is not necessarily connected with religion, and that there are no public duties. Public demands may sometimes fasten upon a man, and hold him as a policeman does, but from them, as from him, it is lawful to escape if we can. He had learned that public duties belong to ethics with which religion has nothing to do, for the church is above the State. By repudiating their share of the taxes, and still more, by teaching their congregations to do so, the churches make a hundred cases of poverty, for every one that their charities relieve.

While the mere interest on those public debts presses heavily upon labor, their oblique operation also cripples industry. Those debts, in the convenient form of interest bearing bonds, offer a safe retreat where capital may revel in idleness drawing good wages for nothing. If those bonds did not provide sinecures for capital, it would be compelled to earn a living by going into partnership with labor in trade, manufactures, farming, and all the various activities which produce and distribute wealth. Those bonds unfairly compete with labor, merchandise and manufactures, in raising the interest on money. They make poverty both ways. It was the grinding power of public debts upon the poor, that caused Jefferson to declare that one generation could not of right make debts for another generation to pay; an abstract sentiment of some value as a warning, but worthless as a rule of political action, because in times of public peril the very salvation of society may depend upon money borrowed on the implied promise of a future generation to pay it. The principal and interest of these debts must be paid, but in the plan of payment there ought not to be any discrimination against the poor.

The revenues of the National Government are obtained in part by indirect taxation, and the machinery employed in levying and collecting is an industrious maker of poverty. As indirect taxes are levied chiefly upon consumption, and especially on the consumption of what are called the necessities of life, they fall with peculiar hardship upon the poor. About a hundred and eighty million dollars a year is obtained by means of a tariff on imports, constructed in such a way as to afford protection to American industry against foreign competition. It is not the purpose of this article to encroach upon the domain of "the two great parties," by discussing the wisdom or the folly of the protective tariff, but merely to suggest that if ethics had been allowed "the privilege of the floor," when the tariff bill was before Congress, that measure would not be, as it is now, an unjust burden upon the workingman.

The actual revenue received by the government from the tariff on imports, and the incidental revenue received by the protected interests from it, are both in their levy and collection unfair to the workingman. The "incidence" of all of it strikes hardest upon him. Suppose a man with fifty dollars a month pays five dollars for sugar; the tax on this is three dollars and fifty cents, or seven per cent. of his income. It is evident that the rich man's proportion of the sugar tax is greatly less than that. Suppose that a man with five hundred dollars a month pays twenty dollars for sugar; the tax on this is fourteen dollars, or less than three per cent. of his income. Apply this principle to clothing, fuel, blankets, crockery, soap, starch, and every other article necessary in the humblest home, and we see at once how unjust and unequal is the apportionment of taxation. The duty on coal is seventy-five cents a ton. If this duty raises the price of coal to the full amount of it, or to any amount, then the share of it paid by the poor man is out of all just proportion greater than the share of it paid by the rich man. Nor does the rich man make up the difference in the purchase of luxuries which the poor man cannot buy. Where the workingmen pay twenty per cent. of their incomes in the shape of duties on the necessities of life which they must buy, the rich men do not pay five per cent. of their incomes in the shape of duties upon luxuries, which they may buy or not as they please.

In actual practice the inequality shown above is made still greater against the poor. When we come to cloth, and a hundred other things, we find a sliding scale contrivance which gives to the rich man a very great advantage. The Commissioner of Labor gives a vivid illustration of this. He shows in his recent report that on clothing goods the rate of duty on the price at the factory gradually increases as the value of the goods declines. Beginning with West of England broadcloth worth $3.50 a yard at the factory, and traveling gradually down through thirty-six different kinds of goods to "cotton warp reversible" worth 45 cents a yard at the

and the printing-press. They left the organization itself free to be shaped by the growth and progress of the ideas and principles which it embodied.

There are, probably, not a few readers of THE OPEN COURT who remember well that first public meeting in Horticultural Hall, Boston, at which the Association was formed. Those who prepared for that meeting and felt the profoundest interest in it could not themselves foresee what would be the result. At the several preliminary private conferences which had been held, of persons interested in the application of the freest thought to religious questions, there had been a difference of opinion in respect to organizing. One of these meetings, held at the house of Dr. Bartol, was a most notable gathering. It was attended by some sixty persons or more, who had been specially invited to consider the question. The discussion was able, earnest, frank, and continued the greater part of the day. Some of the special utterances of that occasion still linger in my ears word for word. With very few exceptions the meeting consisted of those who were of Unitarian affiliations or antecedents. This came to pass, because the occasion which had started the question of a new organization had been given by the action of the National Unitarian Conference, in putting into the preamble of its constitution certain theological phrases against which a minority had earnestly protested. Yet it cannot be said that the voice of this meeting was in favor of organization. It was a divided voice. Some of the ablest and most influential of those who spoke on the question were opposed to organized action. Some of the most radical members of the meeting, though deprecating the Unitarian proceedings and feeling themselves excluded from the National Conference, were averse to any other kind of organization than that of the individual society. Though the result of the meeting was the appointment of a committee to present the same question at a public meeting, to be called and arranged for by them, it can only be said that this conclusion was rather conceded tacitly as a right to those who favored organization than advocated or voted for by a very considerable number of those present. Even that committee became partially dissolved before the time of the public meeting came. It was, therefore, not at all clear what would be the issue of the public step nor whether many people would respond to the call.

In view of these facts, the committee ventured to secure a hall of only moderate size. The Boston Horticultural Hall is estimated to seat an audience of a thousand. Considerably before the hour advertised for the meeting the seats were all taken, and people were beginning to stand in the aisles; and when the committee, a little before the time, reached the hall, they were told that they could not get through the crowded mass of human beings from the front, but must get to the platform from the rear. This packed assembly, occupying every seat and all the standing room and extending out into the vestibule, remained through the greater part of the long morning session. The public notice to which this gathering was the response was very simple. It ran as follows: "A public meeting, to consider the conditions, wants and prospects of Free Religion in America, will be held on Thursday, May 30, at 10 A. M., at Horticultural Hall, Boston." Appended to this was the announcement that R. W. Emerson, John Weiss, Robert Dale Owen, Wm. H. Furness, Lucretia Mott, Henry Blanchard, T. W. Higginson, D. A. Wasson, Isaac M. Wise, Oliver Johnson, F. E. Abbot and Max Lilienthal had been asked to address the meeting, and that addresses might "be expected from most of them." The notice was signed by "O. B. Frothingham, Wm. J. Potter, Rowland Connor, Committee."

It must be remembered that the term "Free Religion" used in this call had not then become the specific appellation which it is now. It simply had the general meaning of religion emancipated from every kind of thrall. It will be noticed, too, that the movement had already passed beyond the boundaries of denominational Unitarianism. Mr. Connor, of the Committee, was then the colleague of Dr. Miner, as junior pastor of the First Universalist Church in Boston. It may here be added that his affiliation with the Free Religious movement cost him his position in that church and denomination. Of the invited speakers, Mr. Blanchard also represented progressive Universalism; Messrs. Wise and Lilienthal were Jewish Rabbis; Lucretia Mott was the well-known and venerated preacher of the liberal division of the Society of Friends; Mr. Owen was a leading light among the Spiritualists; Oliver Johnson represented the Progressive Friends. The others, though they were or had been connected with the Unitarians, were either already doing their work independently of any denominational standing or held their denominational positions of less account than their regard for liberty of religious thought. The actual speakers and the order in which they spoke, were, O. B. Frothingham, who presided, Mr. Blanchard, Mrs. Mott, Mr. Owen, Mr. Weiss, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Abbot, Mr. Wasson, Mr. Higginson and Mr. Emerson. Mr. Emerson had sat in the body of the hall throughout the meeting, unobserved from the platform, and began his remarks by saying that he hardly felt that he had come to the right hall when he found the house so full of people; that he had expected a committee meeting rather than such an audience. He showed that he was deeply interested in the occasion, and at the afternoon session, when a constitution was adopted and organization was effected, he gave a proof of this interest in a way unusual with him. Though not commonly working with organizations nor joining their membership, he was among the first to come forward to have his name

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It is not my purpose here to trace the history of the Free Religious Association during the twenty years of its existence. But I wish to say this: no one can rightly comprehend that history without taking into account these circumstances of the origin of the Association to which I have referred and without noting especially the variety and diversity of elements that made its constituency. If any persons were expecting that this new religious movement would set up the machinery of an active propagandism corresponding to the activity of an ecclesiastical sect—would become, perhaps, itself a new and advanced religious sect—organizing local societies, sending out preachers and lecturers, etc., they were doomed to disappointment, though in the latter particular one or two attempts have been made. It was not to be supposed that the venerable Lucretia Mott would leave the Quaker meeting-house, where after many struggles she had won for herself rational liberty, to join a local "Free Religous" society, should one have been established in her neighborhood; nor that Rabbi Wise, who was one of the first Directors of the Association, would abandon his synagogue to become a lecturer for "Free Religion" as something distinct from the rational ideas and advancing thought which he believed to be embodied in progressive Judaism. Indeed, the constitution of the Free Religious Association expressly declared from the outset that membership there should "affect in no degree [a member's] relation to other associations." By this clause it was evidently intended to declare that the new movement was not to be necessarily a secession from existing religious bodies, or a new body competing with the old in the same general field. It was to do its work in a different way for different ends. And, again, if the Association has not done all that some of its members hoped it would do, and even now believe it might have done, in the field marked out by its own constitution, and especially in promoting certain definite ethical and philanthropic activities, the reason may again be found in the fact of its various and scattered constituency, its members being already engaged more or less in activities of this sort wherever they might be located. In fine, the nature of the organization was of too broad a type to permit, to much extent, other methods of practical work than those adapted to create and shape public opinion, and to inspire the members individually to do the utmost in their power for promoting the objects of the Association in their respective localities and spheres of labor. The work of the Association has been done, therefore, through the public convention, the lecture-platform and the printing-press.

On account of the variety of religious and philosophical beliefs appearing on its platform and to be found in its membership, it has sometimes been said that the Free Religious Association is merely a free parliament for the expression of all opinions on the subjects presented for discussion. But this is a most superficial view of the significance of the Association. It is true that all honest opinions on religious and ethical questions, all varieties of view, have been welcomed on its platform. It is also true that there is great diversity of religious belief among its members, and that the constitution expressly declares that no "test of speculative opinion or belief" shall debar from membership. Yet, through the same constitution, the members do affirm certain very important things together, which gives them a very distinct significance as a religious organization. For one thing they affirm unrestricted mental liberty as the essential condition of their fellowship, as of all true and progressive religious thinking; and then, in the statement of the objects or purposes of the Association, they affirm that all questions of religion and ethics are to be studied by the free reason, according to the methods of modern science, and not under the supervision of ecclesiastical authority; that fellowship is to be determined not by ties of sect or creed, nor even by the Christian boundary, but by humanitarian and spiritual affiliations; and that, of all the so-called interests of religion, morality, the pure character, the upright life, are of vastly more importance than any sectarian prosperity or the creed of any church. I have here somewhat paraphrased the succinct statement of objects as they have stood from the beginning in the constitution of the Association. Certain amendments of phraseology have been made from time to time, not, in my opinion, changing the original essential meaning, but only trying to express it more clearly. Whatever else the members of the Association may have had to say concerning religion, and in connection with whatever other organizations they may have found freedom and opportunity for work, in this constitution they have affirmed together these four positive propositions.

Now, these four affirmations are very momentous. Were they ever affirmed together before by any kind of religious organization on the globe? If they were to be generally acted upon they would revolutionize the religious world. But they are not to take effect by any violent action. They are sure to grow in favor, they are growing in favor; but the change is to be a gradual process,—an evolution. The evolution is already in progress in many churches and denominations, and even in the religions of the world. Every one of these great affirmations has made an important advance in the last twenty years. Various agencies have been helping toward this end; but it may be rightly claimed that the Free Religious Association, as a pioneer society in presenting and holding these ideas before the public, has

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Of course, the great work is by no means yet accomplished. But, in the changed condition of things, the question may be raised whether the time has not come for a reconstruction of the Free Religious organization with a view to adopting more definite and concentrated methods of working for its objects. The new times may have brought new demands; opened fields for labor, perhaps, of a somewhat different kind; matured, possibly, the conditions of a larger opportunity. It is well, therefore, that the approaching twentieth anniversary meeting should take up this question, and this it is proposed to do. That meeting in 1867 was called "to consider the conditions, wants and prospects of Free Religion in America." So let the meeting that is to be held in Tremont Temple, Boston, on the 27th of May, consider the conditions, wants and prospects of emancipated religion in America at this present time. What is the duty of the present hour? What are the wants in this year of 1887? And how can the Free Religious Association meet them? Possibly an entirely new organization is demanded. If so, and this fact were made clear, the Free Religious Association, if true to its own soul, would not cumber the ground to the detriment of another organization that could now better do its work. It is not to this or that form of organization that the genuine devotee of free religion adheres. It is principles and ideas that hold his allegiance; it is the advance of principles and ideas that he craves.

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BY M. M. TRUMBULL.

If the problem of poverty is to be solved in any rational and effective way, we must bring American politics under the dominion of ethics. Ethics must become an active governing power as well as a passive code. It must superintend the work of all our magistrates and require that every act of statesmanship shall rest upon a moral foundation. It must compel the law to apportion our civil burdens fairly, so that no part of the public taxes shall be a dead weight upon industry, pressing the laborer down to a lower plane of life. It is not enough that ethics control our private conduct, it must also direct our public acts and deeds. So long as our politicians can exclude ethics from public affairs and limit its authority to matters of personal character only, so long the statutes of the land will be made for private gain, and so long we shall compete with one another for a share in the profits of wrong.

The reckless making of public debts and their preservation for private advantage, add greatly to the oppression of industry. It is not well for labor when important private interests depend for their prosperity on the increase and preservation of public debt. It is bad for honest business when those debts are converted into capital for the rich, into usury and taxation for the poor. The pressure of public debt squeezes a portion of the useful classes from every layer of society to the tier immediately below, and when it reaches those who are just able to balance income and expenses, it crowds a portion of them into the pit of destitution. Our public debts amount to about $2,200,000,000 and they bear interest at the average rate of about 5 per cent. per annum. This is not a very oppressive debt, we say, for a nation that earns ten thousand millions a year. True enough, but if the burden of it be inequitably adjusted it may cause much poverty in the ranks of those who have to bear it. Many of the local debts have been incurred by jobbery of little or no value to the municipalities involved. They were sown in corruption, they must be raised in incorruption, that is to say, they must be honestly paid, and that payment must come out of the proceeds of useful industry. Mr. Blaine, speaking of these debts at Oshkosh a few years ago, said: "I venture the assertion based on some scrutiny into facts that there has not been realized on the average fifty cents of palpable, permanent value for each dollar raised and expended."

The interest on those debts, to say nothing of the running cost of government, is a drain upon industry that never stops. It is perpetually calling for taxation, and crafty men have shaped the law and practice of impost and assessment in such an ingenious way that the "incidence" of them strikes most heavily upon the laboring man, the clerk, the cottage owner, the small manufacturer, and the merchant of limited means. Such facilities have rich men for undervaluing their property and concealing it, that the rate of taxation in proportion to personal wealth grows lighter and lighter as we ascend, until by the time we reach the man of ten millions it amounts to comparatively nothing. The man whose worldly wealth consists of a little cottage worth a thousand dollars cannot conceal it; he is assessed in full, while the man who owns a million dollars is generally assessed at about $50,000, or one-twentieth of the real value of his property. This is not a guess; it is an actual estimate made from a comparison of the assessor's books, with the records of the Probate Court. In the spring the rich man lists his property to the assessor at seventy thousand dollars; he dies in the summer, and his executors then swear in the Probate Court that its value amounts to two million, five hundred thousand dollars. This is not an imaginary case. It is an actual example taken from the records, a vivid illustration of loyalty to

the law of "self-preservation" in this world, while a prudent insurance against accidents in the next world is disclosed by the reading of the will, which contains a liberal bequest to the church of which our departed brother was an honored and consistent member.

Consistent, indeed, he was. For twenty years he had "worshiped" in a costly temple exempt from taxation, a church, which not only cast the public burdens from its own shoulders on to those of honest industry, but had also entered into a partnership with all other churches to enable them to go and do likewise. In this bad "combine," the partners rise above sectarianism. On this low plane all are orthodox. Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian, Catholic, Jew, all assist each other to evade their duty to the State. Though each believes the other's teaching false, and much of it pernicious, yet each claims tax exemption for the rest on the ground that their false teachings have a virtuous public influence. Our departed brother had only followed the example set him by his church. He had learned from its practice that ethics is not necessarily connected with religion, and that there are no public duties. Public demands may sometimes fasten upon a man, and hold him as a policeman does, but from them, as from him, it is lawful to escape if we can. He had learned that public duties belong to ethics with which religion has nothing to do, for the church is above the State. By repudiating their share of the taxes, and still more, by teaching their congregations to do so, the churches make a hundred cases of poverty, for every one that their charities relieve.

While the mere interest on those public debts presses heavily upon labor, their oblique operation also cripples industry. Those debts, in the convenient form of interest bearing bonds, offer a safe retreat where capital may revel in idleness drawing good wages for nothing. If those bonds did not provide sinecures for capital, it would be compelled to earn a living by going into partnership with labor in trade, manufactures, farming, and all the various activities which produce and distribute wealth. Those bonds unfairly compete with labor, merchandise and manufactures, in raising the interest on money. They make poverty both ways. It was the grinding power of public debts upon the poor, that caused Jefferson to declare that one generation could not of right make debts for another generation to pay; an abstract sentiment of some value as a warning, but worthless as a rule of political action, because in times of public peril the very salvation of society may depend upon money borrowed on the implied promise of a future generation to pay it. The principal and interest of these debts must be paid, but in the plan of payment there ought not to be any discrimination against the poor.

The revenues of the National Government are obtained in part by indirect taxation, and the machinery employed in levying and collecting is an industrious maker of poverty. As indirect taxes are levied chiefly upon consumption, and especially on the consumption of what are called the necessities of life, they fall with peculiar hardship upon the poor. About a hundred and eighty million dollars a year is obtained by means of a tariff on imports, constructed in such a way as to afford protection to American industry against foreign competition. It is not the purpose of this article to encroach upon the domain of "the two great parties," by discussing the wisdom or the folly of the protective tariff, but merely to suggest that if ethics had been allowed "the privilege of the floor," when the tariff bill was before Congress, that measure would not be, as it is now, an unjust burden upon the workingman.

The actual revenue received by the government from the tariff on imports, and the incidental revenue received by the protected interests from it, are both in their levy and collection unfair to the workingman. The "incidence" of all of it strikes hardest upon him. Suppose a man with fifty dollars a month pays five dollars for sugar; the tax on this is three dollars and fifty cents, or seven per cent. of his income. It is evident that the rich man's proportion of the sugar tax is greatly less than that. Suppose that a man with five hundred dollars a month pays twenty dollars for sugar; the tax on this is fourteen dollars, or less than three per cent. of his income. Apply this principle to clothing, fuel, blankets, crockery, soap, starch, and every other article necessary in the humblest home, and we see at once how unjust and unequal is the apportionment of taxation. The duty on coal is seventy-five cents a ton. If this duty raises the price of coal to the full amount of it, or to any amount, then the share of it paid by the poor man is out of all just proportion greater than the share of it paid by the rich man. Nor does the rich man make up the difference in the purchase of luxuries which the poor man cannot buy. Where the workingmen pay twenty per cent. of their incomes in the shape of duties on the necessities of life which they must buy, the rich men do not pay five per cent. of their incomes in the shape of duties upon luxuries, which they may buy or not as they please.

In actual practice the inequality shown above is made still greater against the poor. When we come to cloth, and a hundred other things, we find a sliding scale contrivance which gives to the rich man a very great advantage. The Commissioner of Labor gives a vivid illustration of this. He shows in his recent report that on clothing goods the rate of duty on the price at the factory gradually increases as the value of the goods declines. Beginning with West of England broadcloth worth $3.50 a yard at the factory, and traveling gradually down through thirty-six different kinds of goods to "cotton warp reversible" worth 45 cents a yard at the

factory, the tariff tax amounts to only 50.3 per cent. on the broadcloth for the rich man, while it amounts to 180.7 per cent. on the cotton warp for the poor man. Spread this inequality over hundreds of other things, and we behold a bit of machinery most ingeniously contrived for the manufacture of poverty. This is a question of ethics. It is not claimed here that a protective tariff is not necessary and just; it is only claimed that our tariff, from an ethical point of view, is open to criticism because it makes a great deal of unnecessary poverty by discriminating in favor of the rich and against the poor. It may be wise in principle, but it is unjust in practice.

Beside, rich men may evade the clothing tax entirely by purchasing their clothes in Europe, as thousands of them do. The Astor case is proof that ethics would give a healthier tone to our political system. Mr. Astor, a citizen of the United States, being about to return to his native land from Europe, provided himself with twenty-one trunks, which he filled with valuable new clothing suitable for a millionaire. When he reached New York the Custom House authorities decided that as the clothing was new, and had never been worn, it was liable to tariff duties amounting to $2,006. Mr. Astor paid the demand under protest, and then sued the Collector to recover his money. The District Court decided that the Custom House ruling was correct, but on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States the judgment was reversed, and it was decided that a man might bring a shipload of clothing from London to New York, without paying duty on it, provided that it was for his own personal use, and not for sale. The argument of the above anecdote is this: Any law of taxation which can be evaded by the rich, and cannot be evaded by the poor, is ethically unsound; it is unequal in its exactions, and to the full extent of the inequality it helps to create poverty.

The argument is not weakened by the answer that the workingmen themselves advocate the laws and policies that subject them to extortion and consequent privation. Their folly does not change the character of those laws nor affect their operation. It is hardly credible that workingmen themselves demand that criminals in jail shall be supported in idleness at the expense of honest labor, and yet we know that this demand is made, and that it has been established as the supreme law of New York and Illinois. It is very plain that criminals in jail must be supported by themselves or others, and if workingmen suppose that the support of convicts is a tax upon capital and not upon labor, they are seriously deceived. Every idler, in jail or out of it, is a tax upon the industry of others, and although the expense of him may seem at first to fall upon the "tax payer," it must ultimately fall upon labor, which in the end pays nearly all the taxes. The common welfare demands that every man shall be a producer of something useful to the community, and the more he produces the more valuable he is. The contrary doctrine that there are too many producers and too much production, is a mischievous delusion, more mischievous to the workingmen who advocate it, than to any other class of our people.

It may be that ethics must first enlighten the constituencies before it can dominate our statesmen or purify our laws, but through the discipline of much poverty and tribulation we shall at last learn this lesson, that the true test of any public measure is not whether it is of advantage to me or my trade, to my order, sect, or class, but, is it right?

SEPARATION.

BY JOEL BENTON.

We walked on Alpine summits—you and I,—
High peaks of thought magnificent and free,
But you have found a group apart from me,
Whose cramped horizon dwarfs the boundless sky;
Your purity of aim is nobly high,—
There is no acolyte, nor can ever be,
More full of zeal, love and sincerity,
And for your cause you let all else go by.

Friends still we are, but different ways we go,
Each in his style to solve high spiritual laws;
I wish you happy, and, while I am so
And the old order makes its tender pause,
I think how severed on alien shores we stand,
Farther than any sea from land to land.

New York.

A SILENT INTRUDER.

(A SONNET.)

BY LEE FAIRCHILD.

With weary heart I leave the busy ways
Of men and wander in the leafy wood—
The dusky, timbered fields of solitude—
Whose paths are mantled with the mingled haze
Of sun and shade; where blend and float the lays
Of many birds each singing as it should
Its fragmentary song, half-understood
By him who fain would join their artless praise—
For God loves wordless songs. But I refrain
From mingling with their songs the notes of creeds
(Coinage of brains estranged from heart and love)
Lest Nature, frowning, bid me not again
Intrude upon her fields where Worship pleads
Her cause in call of thrush and coo of dove!

Lewiston, Idaho.

Says the *Christian Register*:

Mr. Moncure D. Conway, in THE OPEN COURT, has published two "Chats with a Chimpanzee." Mr. Conway's method differs from that of the average reporter. Mr. Conway interviews a chimpanzee, and makes him talk like a philosopher. The average reporter interviews a philosopher, and makes him talk like a chimpanzee.

The Open Court.

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THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY

B. F. UNDERWOOD, EDITOR AND MANAGER. SARA A. UNDERWOOD, ASSOCIATE EDITOR.

The leading object of THE OPEN COURT is to continue the work of *The Index*, that is, to establish religion on the basis of Science and in connection therewith it will present the Monistic philosophy. The founder of this journal believes this will furnish to others what it has to him, a religion which embraces all that is true and good in the religion that was taught in childhood to them and him.

Editorially, Monism and Agnosticism, so variously defined, will be treated not as antagonistic systems, but as positive and negative aspects of the one and only rational scientific philosophy, which, the editors hold, includes elements of truth common to all religions, without implying either the validity of theological assumption, or any limitations of possible knowledge, except such as the conditions of human thought impose.

THE OPEN COURT, while advocating morals and rational religious thought on the firm basis of Science, will aim to substitute for unquestioning credulity intelligent inquiry, for blind faith rational religious views, for unreasoning bigotry a liberal spirit, for sectarianism a broad and generous humanitarianism. With this end in view, this journal will submit all opinion to the crucial test of reason, encouraging the independent discussion by able thinkers of the great moral, religious, social and philosophical problems which are engaging the attention of thoughtful minds and upon the solution of which depend largely the highest interests of mankind.

While Contributors are expected to express freely their own views, the Editors are responsible only for editorial matter.

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THURSDAY, MAY 12, 1887.

THE PRIMITIVE STRUGGLE AND MODERN COMPETITION.

Natural selection must have played an important part in the development of man in the early periods of his existence, but happily with his departure from the point of his animal origin the struggle for existence acquired a milder form. Civilized man has emancipated himself from the conditions under which his ancestors struggled, and he has been able to substitute for the forces of the outer world, his own purposive action. He now contemplates his relations and surroundings, and by means of political and social institutions seeks to improve them. He has conceptions of equal rights and reciprocal duties and obligations, with extended sympathies; and these awaken and sustain his interest in the welfare of his race. In these social conditions in which the conduct of men is more and more governed by fixed moral principles and in which the tendency is to work together for the general improvement, the influence of natural selection is small and continually becoming less. "With civilized nations," says Darwin, "as far as an advanced standard of morality and an increased number of fairly endowed men are concerned, natural selection apparently affects but little, though the fundamental social instincts were originally thus gained."

The influence of natural selection on man has become less in proportion as he has consciously exercised his powers for definite ends. In uniting for a common object men have been able to accomplish in a day what might not in a century and probably would never have been brought about by natural selection alone, preventing, too, incalculable suffering and loss unavoidable in a merciless "struggle for existence."

And yet the competitive principle, which has ever been the essential fact in the struggle for existence, prevails and must ever prevail in the highest intellectual and social conditions. Men now compete in useful arts and industries. Educational institutions compete in methods and efficiency of instruction. Institutions of charity compete with one another in relieving want and distress. The doctors, divided into various schools, compete in the art of overcoming disease, each school trying to prove the superiority of its own method. The churches compete in the attractions and inducements offered to increase membership, attendance, and influence, to Christianize the heathen, and to save souls from hell. Very different these and other similar forms of competition, where the manifest object is to contribute to individual and social well-being, from that heartless and cruel struggle in which those only could survive that seized every advantage of strength and position to crush and destroy their less fortunate competitors.

At the same time there are deplorable evils,—the natural outcome of competition as it exists among us to-day,—as seen in the contrasts presented by the extremes of wealth and poverty, and the strained relations between capital and labor. Great wealth gives great power; and they who possess it are very liable to employ it to their own advantage and in the interests of the class to which they belong, with but little consideration for the rights or the welfare of the poor. Intemperance, extravagance, waste, and idleness, no doubt account for much of the extreme poverty that exists, but in spite of this, it is evident as considerate and conscientious capitalists are ready to admit, there is a lack of fair and equitable distribution of the products of labor. Steam and machinery have enormously augmented the power of production; but there is a strong feeling that capital profits

too much, and that labor does not receive the advantages and benefits to which it is fairly entitled from the inventions and improvements of the age. The tendency of modern industrialism is to a division of labor and its employment by large firms and corporations, which, by owning the machinery and paying the smallest possible wages, get most of the immediate advantage of the vast productive power that invention has put into their hands.

For the evils here alluded to numerous panaceas are offered. One wants a high protective tariff, when the only consistent, however unreasonable, protective tariff would be a tariff on every foreigner who comes to America. Co-operation is another hobby with some; and it contains, without doubt, a principle that must be brought more and more into prominence, but only in co-existence with the opposite principle of competition as, for instance, in the profit-sharing enterprises established in Europe and in this country. A condition in which excellence should not be stimulated by incentives and rewarded by advantages would, were it possible, destroy all originality and enterprise. And the incentives and the advantages must be such as appeal to human nature as it *is*. Whether the condition of the workingmen would be improved if the government should enlarge its functions and assume new responsibilities, as the socialists propose, may fairly be questioned. The government, through the influence of wealth and the love of power and rank, is liable to become despotic, as it is in European countries where labor organizations are suppressed, and the meetings of socialists are broken up by the police, and where military power, although derived from the people, awes the people into silence, —countries from which come the class of foreigners who advocate a resort to violence to solve the problem of capital and labor,—the problem of the ages, —which American workingmen are intelligent enough to see must be solved by thought, not by explosions of dynamite. And this should be done while the country is young and the social conditions are flexible and modifiable. With age come the hedges of caste and the hard "cake of custom," which make progress impossible, and which can be broken up only by revolution.

In a country whose government derives its power from the consent of the governed, and where every citizen is a voter, the remedy for all evils that can be reached by legislation is in the hands of the people, if, indeed, they have the intelligence to see what is needed, to subordinate minor issues to a common purpose, to disregard the petty schemes of narrow-minded zealots and the professions and promises of political demagogues, and to unite on sensible and practical measures. Here, where the right to acquire wealth, and to its undisturbed possession when acquired, is recognized by all; where the property is held largely by men who started in life poor,—intelligent men, even of the poorest classes, are not likely to confound the rights and interests of wage-earners with chimerical schemes for putting indolence on a par with industry, and rewarding wastefulness and improvidence equally with economy and forethought.

PULPIT INFLUENCE ON VITAL QUESTIONS.

That the average man who has but little time to spare from his daily avocations should be shown, in the occasional hour he can devote to such study, the right course to be pursued in relation to the vital questions of the community in which he lives, and be brought by the influence of clear thinking and eloquent tongued teachers to know the duty he owes, not only to himself but to his fellow-men, as to these questions, will be admitted, we think, by any thoughtful religious teacher. The better and wiser a citizen, neighbor, husband or father a man is, the more fitted he must surely become for any advanced state of existence that may after this life await him.

Now, the clergy,—*ministers*, as they are claimed to be, to man's highest spiritual welfare; devoted, according to popular notions, to the moral as well as to the intellectual uplifting of their fellow men,—should certainly be the leaders in teaching men their duty on the questions which to-day have a direct bearing on the welfare of the community and of the world at large. Many of these questions are enlisting the close study and thoughtful investigation of philanthropic thinkers outside the pulpit, who co-operate with the press in earnest presentation of the truest solution of these problems. But the preachers, who often get as listeners men and women too busy or too frivolous to read on these subjects, do they generally fulfill their manifest duty by dwelling in clear, convincing manner on these matters?

Pondering this query, we have looked over the list of subjects for last Sunday's sermons in Chicago churches, trying to put ourselves in the frame of mind natural to a man of business anxious to know what attitude is the wisest to take on such questions as the struggle between capital and labor, protection and free trade, temperance, organization of charities, reform in political methods, woman suffrage, acceptance of recent scientific dicta, etc., and desirous of attending that church, whatever its denomination, which promises the best help to him in the solution of these questions, on all of which, as a voter and business man, he is needs called upon to act in some way. We give our idea of what his mental comments might be as he consults the list, which we present in the order in which we read it:

"'The Child Moses'—When I became a man I put away all childish things. 'How to Work'—I understand that quite well now. 'What to Do'—That

might help if the kind of work was indicated. 'The Apostolic Churches'—Too retrospective. 'Haman, or Hanged on His Own Gallows'—That probably has something to do with temperance, since I see Francis Murphy is to speak also, but it sounds too sensational and vindictive; I want to be shown reasonable methods. 'He Began at the Same Scripture, and Preached Unto Him Jesus'—I've been taught that. 'Go Forward'—Don't see my way clear. 'Moses' Preparation for His Work'—Moses cannot help me; he was not a man of this century. 'Individual Responsibility'—That sounds b tter, but vague. 'The Gradual Practical Growth of the Christian Life'—I understand that now. 'The Word of Truth—The Spirit of Truth'—Too vague. 'Remedy for the Weariness of Toil'—It's knowledge I'm in search of, not rest. 'Seed Sowing'—My wild oats are sown. 'General Judgment'—What I need is particular and careful judgment. 'Crop Bearing'—Smacks of the farm. 'Our Duty to Our Mayor and Reform'—Ah, that touches somewhat my needs! 'Liberty Enlightening the World'—Would prefer that about the Fourth of July. 'The Two Rocks'—Makes me think of Scylla and Charybdis. 'The Sacraments'—That will not enlighten me, nor will 'The Communion of the Early Church.' 'Shakespeare as an Interpreter of Religious Truths'—I wish he was living to-day and would interpret for me my duty. 'The Family of Christ'—Just now I want to know what can be done to increase the welfare of the great human family. And the sermons on 'The Magnetism of the Cross,' 'The Expediency of Christ's Departure,' 'Christian Warfare,' 'False Piety,' 'Alive Unto God,' etc., promise no better than the others. 'Ye Say it is Four Months to the Harvest, but I tell you that the Fields are Already White,' might include some helpful suggestions, but more promising is the subject of 'Great Principles and Commonplace Lives,' for it is great principles that I am in search of; but, alas! the preacher in this case, I notice, is not in the least orthodox, but a teacher of ethical culture."

And so our anxious searcher for light from the pulpit goes through the whole published list, embracing various subjects as ill suited to his needs, such as "Old Wills Dug Out," "A Smitten Shepherd" and "House-Cleaning," and it is fair to infer rises from the perusal with a feeling of discouragement that may induce him to trust to circumstances to guide his action on vital questions when presented to him; while on this particular Sunday he takes down his fishing rod and hies him to the lake, since the bait thrown out in the newspapers for him by these "fishers of men" is so unattractive. S. A. U.

In an article entitled "Trial by Newspaper," in the *North American Review* for May, the writer argues that the course followed by the press during the recent trial of the New York aldermen, has helped to encourage a reaction of public opinion in their favor, and that the resentment of many thoughtful minds at the conduct of the press during these trials, is a sufficient indication that the newspaper may take too great liberties. The fact that there was little or no doubt as to the guilt of the accused aldermen did not justify the press in trying the case and pronouncing the prisoners guilty; that was the work of the courts, and as in them only, all the evidence was brought forward and submitted, and all the arguments for and against listened to by a disinterested jury, so to them only belonged the right of trial and decision. Innocent lives have before this been sacrificed to public opinion, and the newspaper with its disposition to try cases in its columns, may administer to the unreasoning and prejudiced feeling that so often exists in the minds of the people. The right of individual opinion cannot be questioned, and the action of judge or jury may with reasonableness be criticised, but the right to try and decide a case belongs to the courts of law alone.

* * *

The 20th anniversary of the Free Religious Association, to be held in Boston on the 26th and 27th of this month, promises to be an exceptionally interesting occasion. Under the lead of President Potter the question is to be raised whether a reorganization of the Association may not be demanded by the changed conditions of the time, to adapt it to new methods of work; and Messrs. M. D. Conway, Wm. M. Salter, A. W. Stevens, M. J. Savage and Thomas Davidson are to make addresses bearing on this theme. Another subject of discussion is the very practical one of "Sunday Observance and Sunday Laws." Capt. Robert C. Adams, of Montreal, is to open this topic, and is to be followed by Col. T. W. Higginson, Judge Putnam, Mrs. E. D. Cheney, Rabbi Lasker and others. Captain Adams is also to preside at the festival in the evening. All the meetings of the Association this year are to be held in the Tremont Temple building, and it behooves all lovers of a religion of reason and humanity to be there.

* * *

Dean Burgon, a churchman, writing in *The Fortnightly* for April, after an unsuccessful attempt to refute Canon Fremantle, whose article entitled "Theology Under its Changed Conditions," appeared in the March number, addresses himself to the reader in the old theological manner. The question of evidence is ignored, and anyone "who has been so unhappy as to have his faith shaken in the Scriptures" "in toiling through the present controversy," "and if not least of all, he has been so ill-advised as to put up with that weakest of unphilosophical imaginations, the hypothesis of evolution," he is told that unless he turns his face away, unless he stops short "in his present downward course," he will reap the terrible consequences that are reserved to

be visited upon those who reject the truth. This is one way to affect the mind. It may be paralyzed by a degrading fear; it may, through a superstitious horror of the consequences, refrain from freely searching for the truth, but there are many minds whose sense of right is not so perverted as to lead them to accept, in the place of free investigation, teaching that stands so evidently in need of confirmatory evidence.

* * *

Writing on the subject of "The Mormon Propaganda," in the *Andover Review* for April, D. L. Leonard, who is a resident of Salt Lake City, finds the striking success of the Latter-Day Saints in making proselytes, one of the most startling of religious phenomena of the age. Over half a million of people in the New World and the Old have since 1830 accepted the teaching of Joseph Smith. The missionaries have had easy work in converting vast numbers of the more ignorant classes and in persuading them to abandon home and friends and flee to "Zion." The missionaries who were sent abroad were instructed to withold certain "truths" (those regarding plural marriage for example), and to answer all questions touching that subject with the promise that all would be explained when "Zion" was reached. At present converts are not so easily gained, as is proved by the comparatively small numbers brought in. Apostacy is frequent in the church, and the danger attending the practice of polygamy no doubt deters many from entering who would otherwise become "children of the house of Israel." The height of Mormonism has been reached and its decline has begun.

* * *

Some of the leading religious periodicals have of late contained articles suggesting remedies for the growing skepticism of the age. In the most of them the ground is taken that the unfaithfulness of professed Christians is one of the most fruitful causes of growing unbelief, and that nothing will make good the losses of the church but more earnestness infused into the lives of those who still remain within the fold. This is indeed the key of the situation, but whether more earnestness can be infused may reasonably be doubted. To those who see deeper than the surface it is evident that the "burning zeal" and "intense faith" which were once so strong have vanished forever. The belief of which they were the expression has fallen before the advance of science, and in their places are the lesser virtues of unreasoning conformity and regular church-going. It does not look as though earnestness could become an element in the lives of the great mass of Christians to-day.

* * *

An International Congress of Free-thinkers will be held in London at the Hall of Science, 142 Old street, E. C., on September 10, 11 and 12. The questions to be discussed are the following:

1. L'enseignement laïque.—Cet enseignement doit-il être neutre dans le sens d'indifférent aux dogmes religieux, ou doit-il être nettement hostile aux croyances religieuses?

1. Secular Education.—Ought this education to be neutral in the sense of indifference to religious dogmas, or ought it to be distinctly hostile to religious beliefs?

2. Qu'est-ce que la Libre Pensée?—Examen des doctrines philosophiques: Spiritualisme, Matérialisme, Positivisme.

2. What is Free-thought?—Examination of the philosophic doctrines: Spiritualism, Materialism, Positivism.

3. Peut-on séparer la question de Libre Pensée de la question sociale?

3. Is it possible to separate Free-thought from social questions?

4. Du role social de la Libre Pensée dans le passé, dans le présent et dans l'avenir.

4. The social *rôle* of Free-thought; past, present and future.

5. De l'influence de l'hypnotisme sur la responsibilité morale.

5. The influence of hypnotism on moral responsibility.

6. Laïcisation de la sépulture.—Crémation.

6. Secularization of funerals.—Cremation.

* * *

The editor of the *Secular Review* (W. Stewart Ross) gives to one of his lady correspondents the following sensible reply to a question asked:

We have no space here to enter into a discussion of the morals of Mary Wolstonecraft. How is it that you seem to be as hard upon her as if she were an ordinary parlor-maid or dressmaker? We will be bound to say that neither Shakspeare nor Burns nor Byron deported himself with half the humdrum decorum of the little man from whom you buy your cheese and bacon; but these men had colossal merits to set off against their foibles; and, if your little cheesemonger and chapel deacon had such foibles, he would have nothing whatever to set off against them, and his existence, instead of being a glory to his country, would be a paltry nuisance to society. Why are you not content with the soaring genius of a character like Byron, without going out of your way to gloat over his human frailties and follies?

* * *

Dr. Edmund Montgomery writes:

Hypnotism is at present uppermost in French and English scientific philosophy. The actual phenomena, which are very wonderful and interesting, will throw much light on mentality. The burning question now is, of course, thought transference,—the action of mental states in one individual on mental states of another individual without sensorial mediation. I do not for a moment believe in it. Professor Delbocuf, who is at present directing his whole attention to hypnotism, and who is a very fair judge, by no means materialistically inclined, says in his recent account of a visit to the Salpitriere: "It is impossible to be too circumspect in judgment on hypnotic phenomena, some of the more mysterious of which,—such as the supposed action of the will across space without physical conductor,—may be explained by coincidences, auto-suggestions, complaisance in observations, or unconscious divination of what is expected." Such, in my opinion, will be the final verdict. That theory of Knowles and Gurney, of vibrations of cerebral molecules being transferred direct from one brain to another, is physically absurd.

* * *

The historical lectures recently delivered in this city by Mr. Edwin D. Mead, of Boston, and the course he is now giving on "Dante—His Religious Significance," "Dante—His Place in History and Politics," "Lessing's Nathan the Wise," "Immanuel Kant," and "Carlyle and Emerson," are spoken of in high terms of praise by those who have heard them. The audiences, not large but composed of men and women of taste and education,

have highly appreciated the intellectual treat with which Mr. Mead has favored them. We wish these lectures could be repeated in every community in the United States. Mr. Mead represents the broad culture and progressive spirit of the age.

* * *

The work entitled *Creation or Evolution*, by George Ticknor Curtis, by which, if we rightly interpret the meaning of the author, the theory of evolution was to have been shown to be untenable and false, has not succeeded in converting many, if the general tenor of criticism may be taken as evidence. It is pronounced a weak and unavailing effort, and W. D. Le Sueur, who reviews it in the May number of the *Popular Science Monthly*, declares with justice that its author attacks the arguments of Spencer and Darwin without an adequate understanding of the theories of either.

* * *

Abbie M. Gannett writes in *Unity:*

George Eliot had a religion, though, so far as we know, it was confined by its practical working to this life. With her religion was duty, "stern and unyielding duty," and her creed "Love ye one another;" she recognized the Law that abideth in all things, and paid reverent homage to it. No religion, when her life was consecration to truth? More and more we are learning that religion consists not so much in belief, as in life. If religion be the "tie that binds man to God," what constitutes that "tie?" Surely a loving devotion to the welfare of his fellow man.

* * *

The *Woman's Journal* of Boston relates the following:

A little grand-daughter of Mrs. Mary A. Livermore dislikes to be made to mind. One Sunday, after some outbreak, her father got down the Bible and showed her the text, "Children, obey your parents." She looked discontented, but went on reading the chapter, while her father went up-stairs. Presently she pursued him, Bible in hand, calling eagerly, "Papa! papa! It says some more. It says, 'Parents, provoke not your children to wrath,' and that is what you do to me every day!"

* * *

Mme. Concepcion Arenal, the distinguished Spanish reformer and authoress, writes from Madrid: "Please add my name to the list of subscribers to the Parker Fund, where are found far more illustrious names than mine, but not one in which this act of reverence is more sincere nor which respects more highly his memory. Parker died far, very far from the spot where he was born, but he does not lie in a foreign land. The country of such a man is the whole earth."

* * *

The commissioners of the Folsom State Prison of California, recognizing the adverse conditions with which discharged prisoners have to contend, are considering whether some supplemental machinery cannot be devised by which they shall be taken care of until steady work of some kind is obtained for them. They are about to prepare a bill to be presented in the Legislature in which this important matter, that so concerns the vital interests of the people, shall be adequately explained. It is to be hoped that the commissioners of other similar institutions will follow this most commendable example.

* * *

"I thank you most heartily for the opportunity given me," writes Edvard Wavrinsky, of Stockholm, Sweden, in sending his subscription to the Parker Tomb Fund, "to express my humble admiration and to honor the memory of the noble Theodore Parker. I am at the head of a society where all are friends and admirers of his work."

* * *

The Sultan of Morocco is a practical prohibitionist. He recently closed the Moorish tobacco and snuff shops, ordered large quantities of tobacco to be burned, and had a number of Moors stripped and flogged through the streets for smoking contrary to his orders.

THE DIAL.

"Non Numero Horas Nisi Serenas."

BY WALTER CRANE.

The lichen gathers where the dial stands,
And ivy round the stone has clinging crept,
And age has stained the carven work of hands
That served some busy brain that long has slept;

The storms and changes of a hundred years
Have marred and blurred the pillar's graceful lines;
But spite of sins and sorrows, time and tears,
Still beautiful its ancient legend shines,

Where lovers lolled and lounged in tender talk,
Above the buried flowers rank grasses grow,
And trailing weeds efface the gravel walk
Where stiff brocades have rustled long ago;

Yet clear mid all this ruin and decay,
The letters gleaming in the golden light,
Defiant and triumphant ever say:
"I take no heed of hours that are not bright."

And bitter rains may beat and tempests rave,
Dark clouds withhold the sunshine from our sight,
Night plunge the starless world as in a grave,
The dial notes no hours that are not bright.

Oh happy dial, waiting for the sun
Through storm and gloom in one long, tender dream;
If dreary days might pass for every one
Like yours, how beautiful our lives would seem.

For who the fretful frowns of fate would fear,
Or scorn that stings or anguish that devours,
If hearts, like Time's serene recorder here,
Took heed of none but golden hours.

ESCHATOLOGY AND ETHICS.

BY M. C. O'BYRNE.

It was, I think, Wagner the physiologist who asserted that, while physiology contained or revealed nothing suggestive of a distinct soul, the soul-tenet or doctrine was nevertheless demanded by man's ethical relations. Expressed in plain English, this is nearly tantamount to the proposition ascribed to Voltaire, namely, that if there were no God, it would, for man's sake, be necessary to invent one. Reservation and timidity are of no nationality, and I do not forget that mankind,—the higher developed of the human race,—has become what it now is in point of the recognized ethical standard, upon and in accordance with old ideas of morality,—a fact which necessarily renders many persons apprehensive of the grave consequences which the general acceptance of materialistic theories would necessarily involve. Of course, it would be vain to deny the gravity of those consequences. If the civilized world really recognized that the acceptance of materialism was obligatory on the conscience of civilized man, then there can be no doubt that not only the basis of ethics, but the whole structure raised thereon would be in a great measure modified if not absolutely changed. The world would then have to acknowledge that no existing law or custom, no restraint on conduct, no institution, whether social or domestic, have the right to impose themselves or to be imposed on us as being originally given by transcendental or divine authority. It would have to discard, or at least to radically modify the signification of, such terms as "moral authority" and "the moral sense," so that the former should mean nothing more than habit-potency and the corroboration of social utility, the latter the change effected by heredity and circumstances upon mere animal instincts, so that "the moral sense" should be taken as signifying only empirical liking. In the pursuit of truth,—if we are to adhere to the scientific method of investigating,—it is surely a sign of weakness should we suffer ourselves to be influenced by considerations of the consequences which may follow in the wake of our discoveries. No one felt this more keenly than the late Professor W. K. Clifford, and I may add that no one has more forcibly expressed his detestation of the policy of reservation, whether prompted by timidity or by the fear of loosening the bands which have for ages bound society together. In his essay on "Right and Wrong," he said:

"Secondly, veracity to the community depends upon faith in man. * * * And yet it is constantly whispered that it would be dangerous to divulge certain truths to the masses. 'I know that the whole thing is untrue, but then it is so useful for the people; you don't know what harm you might do by shaking their faith in it.' Crooked ways are none the less crooked because they are meant to deceive great masses of people instead of individuals. If a thing is true, let us all believe it,—rich and poor, men, women and children. If a thing is untrue, let us all disbelieve it,—rich and poor, men, women and children. Truth is a thing to be shouted from the housetops, not to be whispered over rose-water after dinner when the ladies are gone away."

Let us, however, gladly confess our gratitude to the specialists for the services they have rendered us by helping us on toward the "parting of the ways." This is, undoubtedly, a vital service, even although many of those who have brought us thither have refused to accompany us beyond that point, preferring to rest in some half-way house, actuated not perhaps so much by fear of incurring social odium as by dread of the possible consequences of disseminating opinions whose general acceptance might not only involve the subversion of every existing religion, but also the extirpation of time-sanctioned institutions and the destruction of vested interests.

I have read with interest the paper entitled, "The Basis of Ethics,"* by Mr. E. C. Hegeler. My first impression on reading the essay was that its author, like Wagner, considers some form of soul-tenet must be maintained in order to attain a basis of ethics. Impressed with this conviction, Mr. Hegeler has evolved a unique philosophy which he would use,—and indeed does use,—as the foundation of a religion which, beside its own special characteristics, embraces all that is true and good in Christianity. I think I have here correctly stated the facts as regards Mr. Hegeler's conviction that his religion is capable of promoting what we may for the present define as the moral development of man. At first sight it may appear that the terminology of †animism is somewhat too freely used in the essay. The frequent repetition of such words as "the human soul," the "souls of posterity," and "immortality" is a rather unusual,—not to say surprising,—method to be observed in connection with a monistic exposition. It should be remembered, however, that the point aimed at is the basis of ethics, and since Mr. Hegeler believes that the stream of tendency has throughout the ages been good, he is perhaps desirous, by a judicious adherence to the terminology of older religions, to mitigate the harshness of the religious evolution or transition. Cicero, when instructing his son Marcus, and while expounding what is really the highest,—because the most reason-corroborated,—ethical code known, acts somewhat similarly with regard to the form of religion current among the Roman people; and Matthew Arnold rightly says: "Dissolvents of the old European system of dominant ideas and facts

* THE OPEN COURT, No. 1, page 18.

† "Animism, a term formerly employed in biology to denote the theory of which Stahl is the chief expositor; the theory of the soul (*anima*) as the vital principle, cause of the normal phenomena of life, or of the abnormal phenomena of disease. It is now current in the wider anthropological sense given to it by Dr. E. B. Tylor (*Primitive Culture*, Chapt. II-XVII), as including the general doctrine of souls and other spiritual beings." (*Vide* Ency. Brit., 9th ed.)

we must all be, all of us who have any power of working; what we have to study is, that we may not be acrid dissolvents of it." Nevertheless, while conceding this, we must be very careful not to use words equivocally, but always, as G. J. Holyoake used to say, do our utmost to keep different things distinct.

Having been invited to participate in discussing the monistic philosophy,—a discussion fittingly inaugurated by Mr. Hegeler's paper, which at the very least touches the most vital parts of the great question at issue in the open court of human reason,—I have considered it necessary to make the above preliminary remarks, mainly with the view of showing that in the pursuit of truth our individual likes and dislikes are not of paramount importance.

Mr. Hegeler's thesis may be said to lie under three heads or divisions: First, that dealing with the "human soul;" secondly, the question of immortality, and thirdly, the decision of what is good and bad for man, as affording a sound and safe basis of individual and social conduct. Incidentally also, the "God question" may have to be referred to, since we find it stated in the essay that "God and the universe are one." At the outset, then, of the discussion we have to put this simple query: Is life a dual or monistic process? So far as I can determine, the rational or commonsense,—and therefore scientific,—answer is that matter does its own work and that for us, spirit has no existence. Consequently, that which Mr. Hegeler terms the "human soul" is an office, duty, function, quality (*eigenschaft*, in the more expressive German) of organization. We may otherwise define it as a form of force, of course understanding also that we can nowhere discover force as a principle *per se*, but always as a somatic or material outcome, existing nowhere in nature except as an *eigenschaft* of masses of atoms of matter. In considering this subject we are by its very nature compelled to suppress sentiment; feeling and reason may combine in the results, but reason alone claims absolute and undivided sway in their exposition. The true philosopher speaks and writes in accordance with Newton's dictum,—*non fingo hypotheses.* Indeed, as I understand it, monism is not an hypothesis (a *supposition*), but a thesis (a *position*), and in this respect it only differs from dogma in so far as that it claims no higher authority than reason and that all reasonable human beings possess the power to verify or refute it on data common to all.

With regard to the *modus agendi* of the macrocosm (the universe) and the microcosm (man) there can be only two theories possible to us,—the theory of *vital principle* and the theory of *vital force.* On the former, the existence of two agents in the causation of phenomena is postulated,—that is, a *caput mortuum*, body or matter, animated by soul or spirit. This is animism, the basis upon which the Christian religion, its ethics and its promised immortality undeniably rest. The latter theory uncompromisingly rejects this alleged duality, and claims that matter has within itself its own inseparable vitality, so that what by transcendentalists is held to be spirit-principle is in reality merely *force*, organic or inorganic,—an innate, immanent property of matter, or body itself. This latter theory, applied both to macrocosm and microcosm, is what I understand as monism,—at any rate, it is that which my reason verifies and confirms, and in accord with which I endeavor to mold and regulate my life. So far as I can determine, Mr. Hegeler is also in this sense a monist, and one within whose mental vision the sublime picture of the poet is ever visible:

> "See, through this air, this ocean and this earth
> All matter quick, and bursting into birth.
> Above, how high, progressive life may go!
> Around, how wide! how deep extend below."

It seems to me, however, that in his anxiety to demonstrate the "human soul," the essayist indulges in much hyper-subtile, though ingenious, reasoning. It is certainly the fact that in the region of discovery we owe a great deal to the imagination. Even Newton himself was not, properly speaking, an astronomer, but an ideal physicist,—that is to say, he formulated the laws of the universe as he found them *within himself.* All mathematics are but ideal conceptions. For example, length without breadth exists only in idea,—that is, nowhere but in the mind. In reality we are all idealists, the dullest peasant no less than the poet, inasmuch as all we see is an image or idea of the thing created within ourselves by the creative organ. Mr. Hegeler, however, is not content with boundaries, and he, by the free use of the scientific imagination, builds up a theory by which the formation of concepts in the hemispherical ganglia, or gray matter of the brain, may be explained. I am free to acknowledge that the theory seems to fit the facts, and it requires no great stretch of the imagination to contemplate the cerebrum as an *ekklesia*, or deliberative assembly composed, as the essayist says, "of living, feeling organisms." It is enough for us to know that no spirit, no immaterial essence or principle, but the hemispherical ganglia of the brain constitute the real ego, without which we can have no idea, properly so-called, either of God, or the universe, or a pimple on the nose. As a matter of fact we are not called upon to explain function. Pathology has demonstrated that the cerebral nerves, the sensory ganglia and the hemispherical ganglia, are the respective sources of perception and ideation. It is, as I have said, enough for us to know this, and the ethical basis is by no means dependent on our being able to explain function. Indeed, were it otherwise, it seems that the "culture of ethics" would sorely languish unless some Semite, possessing anterior cerebral lobes which specially favored the preponderance of imagination over reason, should come to revive the cultivation. We may take it as a maxim that there is a natural solution for

everything, but true wisdom assures us that there are limits which we cannot transcend. The rose and the violet have different perfumes, various of our bodily glands form different secretions; the very external world is, with regard to man, an uncertainty, since, according to the laws of optics, everything should be perceived upside down. Eschatology, whether in the field of "natural theology" or of "natural philosophy," is a mere waste of time and energy. Excessive thought is a dyscrasia, an abnormality which can and ought to be only exercised in youth, while we are in formation. God-speculation and physical research are processes for bringing the mind into subjective and objective equipoise, the proper state of the *homme accompli* being one of equilibrium of the brain as of all other organs. "Overthought" endangers that equilibrium, and but too often prepares the way for the thinker to become the victim of the creations of his own imagination, a condition truly pitiable even when compared with that of the illiterate, well-fed, unquestioning clodpole.

From the religious or theological standpoint, the Augustinian monk (à Kempis) was right in affirming that "it is the greatest folly to neglect useful and necessary things while seeking things curious and condemned." I do not question that the *fides carbonaria*, the assured faith of a Job or an à Kempis, favors mental quietude, and perhaps permits its possessors to attain a greater degree of happiness than is possible to those who are perpetually and futilely endeavoring to solve the "riddle of the painful earth," and who are, with respect to what extends beyond man's ectoderm, the solar system,

> "Shut up as in a crumbling tomb, girt round
> With blackness as a solid wall."

Now, however, that the floodgates are lifted, where is the Canute who shall essay to arrest the flood? Zealous missioners of the Incarnate One continue to point toward the "Rock of Ages," but that rock avails nothing save to those who wholly shun the impetuous torrent of research. In Mr. Hegeler's essay, however, a serious attempt is made to provide a succedaneum for the Christian doctrine of immortality. Perhaps in skillful hands the doctrine of race-perpetuation and form-evolution could be made acceptable even to those persons in whom the emotions preponderate. In all candor, however, it is evident that it will have a long and tedious struggle to wage ere it can supplant the immortality of supernaturalism. That which Mr. Hegeler terms the "human soul" is and can be nothing more than the mind in its totality of perception and ideation. If we were, for argument's sake, to concede that this mind is a congeries of living organisms,—in itself this concession is a greater eschatological feat than would be that of the confession of the truth of the Athanasian Creed*—it would still be true that these only acquired vitality when consciousness, the manifestation of their life, began. Prior to the embryonic existence man did not exist as a sentient being, and in what we term death there is simply a revertal to the "nothingness" of unconsciousness. Reason frees us from the chimera of resurrection from the dead, but reason also furnishes us with a perfect substitute in the idea of immortality in our present bodies. Life is a slow combustion, and that which goes on after death is nothing else. According to Plato, the soul possesses knowledge derived from a prenatal state of existence, the inference being that it will continue to exist in some future state. The doctrine of *anamnesis* is the foundation of the theories which ascribe so-called innate ideas to the previous life of the race, those ancestors to whom, as Mr. Hegeler justly says, we are ourselves so much indebted. By these same theories, however, we are precluded from all other immortality than that of the race, but surely this is sufficient to form a basis of right conduct on the part of every rational, that is healthy, individual of the race. It is positively quite refreshing after reading Plato's representation of the doctrine of Socrates, to find Aristotle cutting the Gordian knot by a simple question. Solon had said, "Call no man happy while he lives, but wait to see the end." Does this, asks Aristotle, mean that a man can be happy after he is dead? "*Pantelos atopon:* altogether absurd!"

We have to face the fact that the old ethical codes, for which a divine origin and sanction have been claimed, no longer exercise supreme authority over the enlightened mind as divinely appointed standards of human conduct. I think it is Goethe who says that "the fundamental characteristic of heathenism is the living for the present." If this be true, why should we, who are heathens in the sense not of having been born outside, but of having voluntarily abandoned the Christian pale, be solicitous with respect to the future? Some years ago an English ecclesiastic, the Archbishop of York, publicly affirmed that the advanced thought of the age in which we live tended to establish a doctrine so essentially cruel and selfish that, if logically carried out in the daily lives of men and women, it would dry up the very fountains of benevolence and mutual charity. A "logical result," he said, of this teaching would be that every man would "choose to modify his notions of duty after his own

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* Since this was written, I have read a passage in Dr. Carpenter's *Principles of Mental Physiology* (4th ed., page 18) which seems to indicate that its author would, to some extent, accept Mr. Hegeler's thesis with respect to the individual vitality of organic impressions. It is certainly a bold thought, even though incapable of demonstration. The passage is as follows:

"It scarcely, indeed, admits of doubt that every state of ideational consciousness, which is either *very strong* or is *habitually repeated*, leaves an organic impression on the cerebrum, in virtue of which that same state may be reproduced at any future time, in respondence to a suggestion fitted to excite it." Bearing in mind the mental reservation so characteristic of English *savans*, the opinion expressed by Carpenter approximates quite as nearly as we could expect to Ribot's doctrine of the habit-acquiring energy of living matter,—"the involuntary activity, fixed and unalterable, which serves as the groundwork and the instrument of the individual activity." (*Diseases of the Will*, Chap. I).

fashion." The theological idea of duty is an extraordinary one, its foundation being mainly one of fear. Warped from infancy, the mind of the religionist is unable to form a notion of man's responsibility to man, that is, apart from the idea of deference to God. We know how the decalogue was given:

"When God of old came down from heaven,
In power and wrath He came;
Before His feet the clouds were riven,
Half darkness and half flame."

Agreeing, as I do, with Mr. Hegeler in his opinion that the physical and moral evolution of our race have been co-etaneous and concurrent, I consider that the present standard of ethics would have come down to us had the figment of the two tables of stone never been foisted upon a visionary, imaginative and impulsive people. Accepting, as I must, the maxim that "the normal exercise of every organic function is pleasurable," I am able confidently to believe that the "sovereign good" will be found to lie in the plane of man's necessities, and that it will be found to be the direct product of the requirements of mankind. In quest of this *summum bonum* we need not waste our energies in endless analysis or in eschatological excursions beyond that noumenon which is the *proplasm* of all things visible and invisible.

I fear this paper already exceeds legitimate bounds, so the observations I intended to have made on the question of the existence of God must be deferred. I may, however, be permitted to say that if we were to concede such an existence, it is to me absolutely certain that Pantheism would be the only logical theology.

CORRESPONDENCE.

LETTER FROM NEW YORK.

To the Editors: NEW YORK, April, 1887.

On the anniversary of the death of President Lincoln, Walt Whitman gave a lecture upon that event, together with his reminiscences of Lincoln, before a theater full of the literary people of this city. That was a noteworthy scene, when the "good, gray poet" slowly made his way, with the help of an usher, to a seat upon the stage and became the focus of attention.

The picturesque, virile old man has a noble, dome-shaped head surmounting a ruddy, large-featured face fringed with white hair and a flowing beard. The blue eyes are still clear and bright, the expression of the face frank and noble, the voice sweet and sympathetic. It is Homer without his blindness.

Whitman's recollections are told in a style both graphic and tender. Only a nature so comprehensive as this could interpret that undeveloped greatness untimely sent away before it could understand itself or be understood by others.

Among the listeners that day could be seen the chief editors, actors and authors of the city, beside such men as Lowell, Charles Eliot Norton, President Gilman of Johns Hopkins, John Burroughs, and many others.

That New York is becoming an important ethical, as well as literary, center can safely be asserted. Is it possible that the Hub is moving westward and threatens to take New York on its way toward Chicago? However that may be, more than ever before is literature the ally of ethics. The vital, upward-tending movements of the age are manifesting themselves in every form. They will not down at the bidding of the dilettanti. The writer who spends his life in reporting "psychologic semitones" while great passions are seething and great blunders and stupidities wait to be corrected, will soon be restricted to a small and effeminate circle.

Such thoughts forced themselves upon me while perusing Helen Campbell's *Prisoners of Poverty*, fresh from the press of Roberts Bros. It is the condensed cry of anguish of 200,000 working women of this city, whose inarticulate moans are lost in the roar of our Christian civilization,—a civilization which is the real Juggernaut, and this the real India which stands in need of missionaries. Mrs. Campbell's book, while packed with facts enough to gorge a Gradgrind, is yet as vital as any true work can possibly be. If it only serves to enlighten women in regard to the social injustice in which they have been unwitting partakers, and sets them to making departures from old methods of dealing with women's work and wages, each in her little circle, then there will be the beginning of a new social order. They have it in their hands if only they profoundly feel their power and see how to use it,—a power invisible, pervasive and powerful. But where is the Joan of Arc who shall inspire, direct and lead on to the assault against the citadel of wrong? Individual work is the initial step; associated work will naturally follow. Either we must come to that or be driven "by whips of scorpions" in the right way.

The book, as it appeared in separate chapters in the Sunday *Tribune*, was discussed in every social circle, and Mrs. Campbell has been invited to present her experiences and views before various working societies. It remains to be seen how the orthodox will treat the subject of work and workers.

Dr. George F. Pentecost, in the *Homiletic Review*, severely arraigns the Christian church, and shows a generous scorn for that misnamed religion which huddles together a score of Protestant cathedrals, representing millions of dollars, where the rich worship God in a fashionable manner, while so near to them their fellows are perishing in squalor, filth and ignorance. He declares that seven-tenths of the resources of the church are lavished upon less than three-tenths of the people, and they the favored classes.

On the other hand I lately heard a sermon from the pastor of a Fifth avenue church which, with parsonage and accessories, cost a round million of dollars. Nearly 2,000 persons, including among them some of the most prominent editors, railroad kings and millionaires, were present. The sermon, or rather exhortation, a series of truisms unvitalized with real belief or feeling, but enunciated in sonorous English, fell like icicles upon the somnolent congregation. The reverend doctor spoke with proper haughtiness of the desire of the laborer for better conditions. "Those creatures," said he, with ineffable scorn, "these creatures are unsatisfied with a Christian civilization!" He declared that the world at large now felt the same hatred of Christ that the Jews once cherished toward Him. "They would crucify us to-day if they could. Do not make the mistake of thinking otherwise," he asserted; and no one said him nay. What shall be thought of such spiritual food, and of its acceptance by one of the foremost churches of this continent?

Another kind of teaching is going on further down town. Chickering Hall is packed with people every Sunday morning and hundreds go away for want of room. But there is work as well as faith under Mr. Adler's fostering care. The Workingman's School, conducted under the auspices of the United Relief Works of the Society for Ethical Culture, is doing noble practical work. The teachers try to make the labor of the hands help the development of the brain rather than to simply create artisans.

To this end there is modeling in clay and drawing elementary geometrical forms, first of all. Pupils then use pasteboard and

simple tools, flat wood, blocks of wood, and various systematic mechanical devices. The managers rely strongly upon the moral effect of systematic work upon the mind of the child,—a reliance which all close students of human nature will think well founded. In a late report by them one sentence strikes the key-note of the subject, "The sense of rightness, translated into terms of human conduct, becomes the sense of righteousness." Could the same number of words be made to express a truth of higher value to the educator?

Pupils construct their own apparatus in the shop, and are thus "placed in the attitude of original investigators into the phenomena of nature," the teacher serving to prevent waste of effort. Free-hand drawing is taught to all, and the child has a varied succession of lessons, so the brain and body are spared the exhaustion of long-continued application to one subject.

Girls find occupation in the cutting and fitting of garments, and in original ornamental designing for the more advanced. It occurs to me that here, if anywhere, the managers have failed to extend the scope of mechanical industry into other pursuits, as they might have done, but there is little room for anything but praise. An English lady who has been a teacher during the last ten years in the foremost English training school, and who is now taking a vacation for the purpose of examining the school systems in this country, told me, very lately, that this exceeded any she had yet seen, and her travels had extended from Quebec to St. Louis. Let us be thankful for so good a beginning and trust that many others may emulate this noble example.

HESTER M. POOLE.

THE OPEN COURT.

To the Editors: SELBY, ONT.

The Index left but very little to be desired; and that little seems to have added itself without delay to THE OPEN COURT.

"What's in a name? A rose would smell as sweet by any other name." Well, there is, after all, a good deal in a name, and I cannot imagine how a better name than THE OPEN COURT could possibly have been selected for such a paper as THE COURT proves to be. The name seems quite original, and its selection characteristic of its author; and from what I know of him through years gone by I am well satisfied that this COURT, unlike a good many of the civil courts, will be a court of justice, impartiality, honor and dignity, and that it will be OPEN for evidence as long as there is any to come in.

"Devoted to the work of establishing ethics and religion upon a scientific basis." This is what THE OPEN COURT has set itself to do. *Hic labor, hoc opus est.* And at this critical juncture no more important field for urgent work could have been chosen. For the present is certainly a most critical period in the moral and religious history of the world. The old religions are crumbling to pieces, including the arbitrary, theological, moral sanctions; and the dissolution is so rapid that the masses have difficulty in readily recovering their moral footing. The work of reconstruction must of necessity be slower than that of demolition. Of necessity slower, because, although the philosopher can grasp the new and better principle and rapidly readjust himself to his moral environment, the peasant cannot do so with equal facility. And right here in the midst of this momentous revolution in man's moral and religious beliefs is one most deplorable and discouraging aspect of the upheaval. This is the abject theological pessimism of the times. On every hand from the theologians in the church and out of it, and even from some *quasi* philosophers who ought to know better, we hear the weak and pusillanimous cry that morality must go down along with the Christian sanctions thereof, that morality cannot stand without the Christian religion. This is a most pernicious teaching. It is in effect saying to the masses: "When the popular Christian sanction of moral conduct is withdrawn there is nothing left to bind you to the right, you may follow your lower nature without fear of moral consequences." Now, even were it true that there is no moral sanction outside theology, the man who is a well-wisher of his fellows would try and invent a good and sufficient reason for doing right instead of closing his eyes to a perfectly valid one. But that there is a thoroughly legitimate and valid basis in science for the purest morality and the highest religion is becoming perfectly apparent to all honest, intelligent and instructed minds. Were this not so, the moral and social outlook for humanity would surely be at present dark enough, seeing that the theological basis of morality and religion is inevitably doomed. This, then, being certain, the plain duty of every man who has the new light is to do what in him lies to set his lost or fallen neighbor on his feet again on safe and solid ground. If our Christian friends really have the good of their fellows at heart they will cease prophesying and proclaming moral ruin to the world because their creed is gone, and join us in an effort to rally and reassure our fellow-travelers. Knowing what we do, however, of human nature in its present stage we can hardly hope for this, and must be content to go on faithfully and do what we can, inspired by the hope that the light now breaking will in due time be as the noon-day sun. To hasten this rising sun toward the meridian is obviously the high motive and object of establishing such a magazine as THE OPEN COURT. And, as previously remarked, at this critical period in the development of man's moral and religious nature, no higher motive or more laudable object could possibly move the proprietor and editors. All hail, then, to THE OPEN COURT, and all honor to such philanthropists, actuated by that genuine altruism which will, we hope, in the near future more freely characterize the average man.

ALLEN PRINGLE.

THE PARKER TOMB FUND.

Correspondence between W. J. POTTER and THEO. STANTON.

To the Editors:

The following letter explains itself:

NEW BEDFORD, MASS., Feb. 9, 1887.

MR. THEODORE STANTON,

My Dear Sir: As the movement for securing money to renovate Theodore Parker's grave at Florence appears to have been started by you, I write to you to learn your views with regard to carrying out the project, and also to represent to you a feeling which has shown itself pretty strongly among Mr. Parker's nearest friends here against any interference with the original *design* of the structure. You, perhaps, noticed Miss Hannah Stevenson's letter in *The Index* last summer on this point. She lived in Mr. Parker's family for many years; was with him and Mrs. Parker when he died, and says that the arrangements of the grave were all designed in accordance with the wishes of the family, and following what they knew to be Mr. Parker's own wishes. Others of Mr. Parker's friends in Boston knew these facts, and, therefore, the subscription to the fund has been slight among them. Others, most probably, would not have subscribed if they had known these facts at the outset, and had felt that the money was to be positively used for a new kind of structure. I, for one, should not have done so. And when I subscribed I assumed, as perhaps others did, that what was to be done was not definitely settled—including the proposed bust—but would depend on the opinions the proposition would call forth, as well as on the amount of money subscribed. My own present judgment is, now that I know the feeling of these friends nearest to Mr. Parker and his family, and know Mr. Parker's own feeling, that the *design* of the grave should be preserved. Perhaps a more durable stone may be needed and renovation required from time to time; and the shrubs and flowers may need annual care to keep them abundant. Yet I would not have the grave look too artificial; let *nature* do something. Parker was a child of nature and Puritanism. It is evident that some of the visitors who think it looks "neglected" do not find it sufficiently *trimmed*. Perhaps if there should come money enough,

a bust of Parker might be placed somewhere else in Florence, with an inscription stating where he is buried, and his own request for a simple grave. Yours truly,

WM. J. POTTER.

As other friends of Theodore Parker and other subscribers to the Fund may have questions to ask similar to those put in Mr. Potter's letter, it has occurred to me that it might be well to give publicity to this letter and to my comments thereon, which follow:

Mr. Potter asks two closely connected questions: 1. My own views in regard to carrying out the project. 2. Whether this project will modify the original design of the grave.

In answer to the first point I may say that my own wishes would be satisfied if a good bronze bust or medallion of Parker were placed on his tomb. This is a common practice in European cemeteries, and would be a source of pleasure to those who visit the grave. But who should make this bust or medallion, if it should be made at all; how the order should be given; who should decide on its merits—all these details I have never considered, and, perhaps, it would be premature to do so at present. My friends who have subscribed to the Fund have understood that the money was to be used "to improve the condition of Theodore Parker's grave." When it shall have been thought proper to cease collecting further subscriptions, plans might be suggested as to how the Fund should be employed so as to meet with the approbation of the majority of the subscribers. This, however, is simply a suggestion of mine.

Now a word about interfering with the original design of the grave. Although I fail to discover in this original design any artistic or architectural claims for its preservation, still if the near friends of Mr. Parker cling to it on sentimental grounds, I see no reason for unnecessarily wounding their feelings by changing it. But if we should finally decide to place a bust or medallion over he grave, and if we should then find that the present design must be modified in order to conform to the artistic requirements of the new situation, I suppose that the friends of Mr. Parker will then yield gracefully, provided nothing is done to destroy the simplicity that Theodore Parker himself desired should characterize his last resting place.

To sum up, it seems to me that not until the subscription is closed and we know how much money we have, and, consequently what can be done, will it be possible to say what form the memorial should take; and when this is decided it will then, and not until then, be possible to know whether or no the original design of the tomb must be interfered with.

Paris. THEODORE STANTON.

FREE RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION.

The twentieth annual meeting of the F. R. A. will be held in Tremont Temple, Boston, May 26 and 27, commencing with a business session in Vestry Hall, 88 Tremont street, on Thursday, May 26, at 7.45 P.M.

The public convention, on Friday, will consider, at its first session, beginning at 10.30 A.M., the Prospects of Free Religion. An essay is expected from the President, Potter, with speeches from Messrs. Conway, Davidson, Stevens, Savage and Salter.

The convention will reopen at 3 P.M. with a speech by Captain R. C. Adams, on Sunday Amusements; Judge Putnam will next state what the Sunday Law of Massachusetts is as recently amended, and the discussion will be continued by Colonel T. W. Higginson and other speakers. Both sessions will be held in the large hall, and all interested are invited cordially.

The festival will be held as usual in the Meionaon, 88 Tremont street. Doors open at 6 P.M.; supper ready at 6.30; speaking to begin at 8; orchestral music. Captain R. C. Adams will preside and be assisted by others of our favorite speakers. Reserved seats, $1.00, for sale by Messrs. O. Ditson & Co., 451 Washington street, by Crandon & Co., 11 Hanover street, at the office of the Woman's Journal, and at the convention. Admission to gallery, 50 cents.

F. M. HOLLAND, Secretary.

MIND-READING.

To the Editors: LA SALLE, ILL., May 4, 1887.

In the latest number of THE OPEN COURT, Mr. Minot J. Savage touches a very interesting subject in his article on mind-reading. He speaks of his experiments, "the story of which in any fulness would require a volume." He mentions their unaccountableness, but I wish that he had given us the most striking example of his experience; one will serve for many. I have some experience myself on this field. I experimented with the psychograph and otherwise; but must confess that there is much scope for self-deception. Faust is right when saying: *Das Wunder ist des Glaubens liebstes Kind.* Whosoever believes beforehand, will be easily convinced by what he calls facts.

The very best essay I have read on this subject of mind-reading is written by Professor Preyer in an essay *Das Gedankenlesen.* Hypnotism should not be confounded with mind-reading, but on hypnotizing, magnetizing and other psychological problems, the very same scientist has written diverse valuable articles, most of which are published in the *Deutsche Rundschau.*

I do not have at hand Preyer's essay on mind-reading, but I remember that he treated the subject with great thoroughness, and at the same time is far from attaching to it any mysticism, as may be expected of a sober observer like him.

Sincerely yours,

PAUL CARUS.

BOOK REVIEWS.

DER PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITICISMUS, und seine Bedeutung für die positive Wissenschaft. Von *Prof. A. Riehl.* Erster Band: Geschichte und Methode des philosophischen Kriticismus. Zweiten Bandes erster Theil: Die sinnlichen und logischen Grundlagen der Erkenntniss. Zweiter Theil: Zur Wissenschaftstheorie und Metaphysik. Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann, 1879–1887.

Among the works of contemporary German philosophic writers who attach themselves to Kant, Professor Riehl's *Der Philosophische Kriticismus*, is perhaps, the most important. A. Riehl (Professor of Philosophy in the University of Freiburg, in Baden) cannot be called a Kantian, since he differs from Kant in many essential points; but in certain fundamental thoughts he is at one with him. He is a representative of what THE OPEN COURT regards as the "only rational, scientific philosophy," of "Monism and Agnosticism;" and for that reason the present writer believes that the work, particularly the last part of it, will be of special interest to the readers of THE OPEN COURT. The first volume treats in admirable manner the history of the methods of philosophical criticism—considering not only Kant, but also Locke and Hume. The second volume considers in its first part the bearing of sensation upon the theory of knowledge, the origin and significance of the conceptions of time and space, perception, the principle of identity and that of sufficient reason, the relation of causality, the conceptions of substance and force and the principle of quantity. The second part, which will doubtless find a larger circle of readers than the earlier parts, analyzes the notion of philosophy and treats of the metaphysical as contrasted with the scientific method of constructing systems; and the "caricature of science and common sense, that in Hegel is called philosophy," is subjected to sharp criticism. The author cites (pp. 120–127) passages from Hegel's works which thoroughly justify his verdict

upon this sort of philosophy. As now *Hegelei* has rather passed away in Germany, and is finding many followers in America, it is to be hoped that Riehl's criticism of it may be deemed worthy of mature consideration on the other side of the big ocean. The result of Riehl's criticism of metaphysics (regarded as a doctrine of the nature of things-in-themselves) is the demonstration of its impossibility, which result our author maintains in a more unequivocal way than Kant, who sought to establish metaphysics on a practical instead of a theoretical basis. Philosophy as a special science is not, according to Riehl, a view of the world (*Weltanschauung*); this is given to us as a result of all the positive sciences, which were themselves what the ancients understood under the name philosophy. But philosophy is in its theoretic part the science and criticism of knowledge, and in its practical part the doctrine of moral ideals. The author next, in a chapter on the limits and presuppositions of knowledge, combats the "complaints of the inability of man's understanding to penetrate into the essence of things," and shows that what has often been regarded as a limit of human knowledge, belongs to the nature of all knowledge,—knowledge never consisting in a doubling of things, but only in the expression of them in consciousness. To compare the worth of a thing with its representative in consciousness, its "phenomenon," is not permissible, because the unknown cannot be compared with the known.

In another chapter on the "origin and notion of experience," the author discusses empiricism and nativism and criticises the very problematical theory of "unconscious syllogisms," and explains the significance (which according to him is subordinate) of Darwin's theory of evolution for transcendental philosophy. A further chapter handles in excellent fashion the question of the reality of things and discusses the various idealistic theories, the untenability of which is demonstrated. The ensuing investigations into the relation of the psychical phenomena to material processes follow the lines of Kant and are among the profoundest parts of the whole work. Then comes a varied discussion of the vexed problem of determinism, in which the author opposes the views of Professor William James. Riehl regards determinism as an indispensable foundation for morals. The next chapter treats of the question of the Infinite, and the last chapter of necessity and design in nature.

G. v. GIZYCKI.
Berlin.

IN THE WRONG PARADISE AND OTHER STORIES. By *Andrew Lang*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1887.

This little volume derives its title from a humorous comparison of the Greek elysium, the Moslem paradise, and the happy hunting ground of the Indians. The aim is to expose "the vanity of men and the unsubstantial character of the future homes that their fancy has fashioned," including "the ideal heavens of modern poets and novelists." "To the wrong man each of our pictured heavens would be a hell, and even to the appropriate devotee each would become a tedious purgatory." Still bolder in treatment is "The Romance of the First Radical." Why-Why, though a child of the stone age, said in his heart that theology was "bosh-bosh." The medicine-men, "who combined the functions of the modern clergy and of the medical profession," had no influence over him, after they had frightened his sick mother to death, by pretending to drive the devil out of her. He was shockingly irreverent even "on tabu-days, once a week, when the rest of the people were all silent, sedentary and miserable (from a superstitious feeling which we can no longer understand);" though some of us still keep up the old savage custom. Worst of all, he refused to marry in the orthodox way, by knocking down some stray stranger in the dark and dragging her off a captive. He actually dared to make love to a slave-girl and elope with her after she had saved him from falling a victim to a time-honored observance. Thus the first radical was the first lover. Ere long he became the first martyr also, and died, predicting that the day would come when there will be no more slavery to medicine-men. We are drawing near to the fulfillment of Why-Why's prophecy.

THE ART AMATEUR for May has some novelties in striking designs for carved oaken chests for halls. The little sketch of "Comrades," by Ellen Welby, is very pretty, although the dog seems rather to eclipse the child, whose pleased face must be imagined from the earnest look in the dog's eyes, who seems thoroughly satisfied with her attentions. The reports from sales and exhibitions show an encouraging interest in art. Miss Wolfe's munificent gift of $200,000, beside her collection of paintings, to the Metropolitan Museum of Art, will give a powerful impulse to this important institution. Good museums are the people's schools, where they may study and enjoy great masterpieces as well as if they were their own property. They are great conservators of art, preserving many a precious object which would go to destruction without them. The true collector takes a genuine satisfaction in placing the results of his lifetime where they will not, under any ordinary circumstances, be separated and lost. Friends of art too often forget, however, that the administration of a museum is as important as its collection, and most of our institutions suffer from the want of means to support an adequate corps of well instructed persons to take care of their pictures and statues and to reveal their worth to the public. We are glad to read that the Boston Art Museum has in part supplied this want, and has appointed Mr. Robinson its curator of classical antiquities, and Mr. Koehler of engravings. Mr. Koehler has just opened an exhibition of etchings by Rembrandt. Mr. Robinson has published a catalogue with the history and description of the sculpture in the museum. There are many other good things in this number, both in the letterpress and in the illustrations. Mr. Virgil Williams shows that artists are not wholly impractical in his significant hint that "a purchaser always likes his picture better after it is paid for." Miss Wheeler gives some hints for decorating seashore houses which are suggestive and seasonable. The instructions to young students in design painting and photography are very helpful.

WE have received the first number of *Co-operative News of America*, a somewhat long name for so small a paper, but, perhaps, its originators named it with hope that the *Co-operative News of America* would soon so largely increase that the paper could be enlarged to accord with the dignity of its title. It is to be published quarterly by the Co-operative Board of the Sociologic Society of America, information in regard to which, with explanatory pamphlets, tracts, etc., may be obtained by application to Mrs. Lita B. Sayles, Secretary, Killingly, Conn.

THE PARKER TOMB FUND.

A fund is now being raised by the friends and admirers of Theodore Parker to improve the condition of his tomb, in the Old Protestant Cemetery, Florence, Italy. The list of subscribers to date is as follows:

Miss Frances Power Cobbe, England,	£1.
Rev. James Martineau, D.D., "	1 guinea.
Professor F. W. Newman, "	£1.
Miss Anna Swanwick, "	£1.
Rev. Peter Dean, "	5 shillings.
Mrs. Catharine M. Lyell, "	1 guinea.
Miss Florence Davenport-Hill, "	£1.
William Shaen, Esq., "	£1.
Mme. Jules Favre, Directress of the State Superior Normal School, Sevres, France,	10 francs.
M. Joseph Fabre, ex-Deputy, Paris, France,	10 francs.
M. Paul Bert, of the Institute, " "	10 francs.
Professor Albert Reville, " "	10 francs.
M. Ernest Renan, of the French Academy, Paris, France,	10 francs.
R. Rheinwald, publisher, Paris, France,	10 francs.
Mme. Griess-Traut, " "	3 francs.
Rev. Louis Leblois, Strasburg, Germany,	5 marcs.
Miss Matilda Goddard, Boston, Mass.,	$25.00
Mrs. R. A. Nichols, " "	5.00
Caroline C. Thayer, " "	10.00

F. H. Warren, Chelmsford, Mass.	$5.00
F. W. Christern, New York,	5.00
Mrs. E. Christern, "	5.00
Louisa Southworth, Cleveland, O.	10.00
S. Brewer, Ithaca, N. Y.	1.00
E. D. Cheney, Boston,	5.00
A. Wilton, Alexandria, Minn.,	2.00
David G. Francis, New York,	5.00
Robert Davis, Lunenburg, Mass.,	5.00
H. G. White, Buffalo, N. Y.,	5.00
M. D. Conway, " "	5.00
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J. Cary, M. D., Caribou, Me.,	1.00
Mrs. Stanton-Blatch, B. A., Basingstoke, Eng.,	5.00
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Jacob Hoffner, Cincinnati, O.,	5.00
Charles Voysey, London, England,	10 shillings.
Count Goblet d'Alviella, Brussels, Belgium,	20 francs.
Luther Colby (Editor *Banner of Light*),	$10.00
B. F. Underwood, Chicago, Ill.,	5.00
James Eddy, Providence, R. I.,	10.00
Chas. Nash and Sister, Worcester, Mass.,	5.00
Fred. H. Henshaw, Boston, Mass.,	5.00
Rose Mary Crawshay, Breconshire, Eng.,	£2.
Geo. J. Holyoake, Brighton, "	5 shillings.
James Hall, St. Denis, Md.,	$5.00
S. R. Urbino, Boston, Mass.,	5.00
E. C. Tabor, Independence, Iowa,	5.00
Mentia Taylor, Brighton, Eng.,	£1.
G. W. Robinson, Lexington, Mass.,	$5.00
G. P. Delaplaine, Madison, Wis.,	5.00
Mrs. L. P. Danforth, Philadelphia, Pa.,	5.00
P. B. Sibley, Spearfish, Dak.,	1.00
M. J. Savage, Boston, Mass.,	5.00
Wm. J. Potter, New Bedford, Mass.,	10.00
Caroline de Barrau, Paris,	10 francs.
Joseph Smith, Lambertville, N. J.,	$2.00
John H. R. Molson, Montreal, Canada,	5.00
Miss Kirstine Frederikson, Denmark,	1.00
Mrs. T. Mary Broadhurst, London, Eng.,	£1.
Miss A. L. Browne, " "	10 shillings.
R. Heber Newton, Garden City, N. Y.,	$5.00
S. C. Gale, Minneapolis, Minn.,	10.00
R. E. Grimshaw, Minneapolis, Minn.,	5.00
E. M. Davis, Philadelphia, Pa.,	5.00
Mrs. Rebecca Moore, London, Eng.,	5 shillings.
Axel Gustafson, " "	5 shillings.
Zabel G stafson, " "	5 shillings.
Mrs. Laura Curtis Bullard, New York,	$5.00
Annie Besant, London, Eng.,	5 shillings.
Fredrik Bajer, Deputy, Copenhagen, Denmark,	3 francs.
Mlle. Maria Deraismes, President y the Seine-et-Oise Free Thinkeo Federation, Paris,	5 francs.
Bjornstjerne Bjornson, Norway,	20 francs.
H. L. Brakstad, London, Eng.,	5 shillings.
M. Godin, Founder of the Familistere, Guise, France,	10 francs.
Jane Cobden, London, Eng.,	1 guinea.
H. E. Berner, Christiana, Norway,	20 francs.
J. M. Yeagley, Lancaster, Pa.,	$5.00
Dr. Samuel L. Young, Ferry Village, Me.,	1.00
J. W. Braley, New Bedford, Ma s.,	3.00
M. M. Manigasarian, Philadelphi., Pa.,	2.00
Miss Leigh Smith, Algiers, Africa,	£1.
Dr. J. F. Noyes, Detroit, Mich.,	$2.00
John C. Haynes, Boston,	10.00
M. T. Adams, Boston, Mass.,	1.00
Rosa M. Avery, Chicago, Ill.,	1.00
Miss Abbie W. May, Boston, Mass.,	10.00
Rev. R. Fisk, Watertown, N. Y.,	1.00
Henry W. Brown, Worcester, Mass.,	2.00
Joseph Wood, Bar Harbor, Me.,	2.00
W. M. Salter, Chicago, Ill.,	1.00
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W. L. Sheldon, St. Louis, Mo.,	1.00
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James D. Atkins, Florence, Mass.,	5.00
W. L. Foster, Hanover, Mass.,	2.00
Felix Adler, New York,	5.00
Frederick Douglass, Washington,	4.00
Auguste Desmoulins, Member of the Paris Town Council,	3 francs.
Señora Concepcion Arenal, Gijon, Spain,	10 "
M. Victor Schœlcher, Senator, Paris,	10 "
Mrs. Elizabeth Smith Mil er, Geneva, N. Y.,	$10.00
Miss Helen H. Gardener, New York,	1.00
Theodore Tilton, Paris,	1.00
Courtlandt Palmer, President of the N. Y. Nineteenth Century Club,	2.00
A. C. Larsen, Copenhagen, Denmark,	3 francs.
Edvard Wavrinsky, Stockholm, Sweden,	5 "
Richard A. Proctor,	$5.00

Subscriptions may be sent to THE OPEN COURT or to John C. Haynes, 451 Washington street, Boston, Mass.

THE FREE RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION.

Was organized in 1867. Though having its headquarters in Boston, it is a national organization and has members and officers in various States of the Union. It has the following

CONSTITUTION.

I. This organization shall be called the Free Religious Association.

II. The objects of this Association are to encourage the scientific study of religion and ethics, to advocate freedom in religion, to increase fellowship in spirit and to emphasize the supremacy of practical morality in all the relations of life. All persons sympathizing with these aims are cordially invited to membership.

III. Membership in this Association shall leave each individual responsible for his own opinions alone and affect in no degree his relations to other associations; and nothing in the name or Constitution of the Association shall ever be construed as limiting membership by any test of speculative opinion or belief—or as defining the position of the Association, collectively considered, with reference to any such opinion or belief—or as interfering, in any other way, with that absolute freedom of thought and expression which is the natural right of every rational being. Any person desiring to co-operate with the Association shall be considered a member, with full right to speak in its meetings; but an annual contribution of one dollar shall be necessary to give a title to vote—provided, also, that those thus entitled may at any time confer the privilege of voting upon the whole assembly, on questions not pertaining to the management of business.

IV. The officers of the Association shall be a President, twelve Vice Presidents, a Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, a Treasurer and twelve Directors. They shall be chosen by ballot at the annual meeting of the Association; and the President, Vice-Presidents, Secretaries and Treasurer shall hold their offices for one year, or until their successors be chosen. The Directors shall be chosen for four years and, at the expiration of that term, shall not be eligible for re-election until after two years. One fourth of their number shall be chosen annually; but at the annual meeting of 1882, the full number of twelve shall be chosen in sections of three respectively, for one, two, three and four years. The President, Secretaries, Treasurer and Directors shall together constitute an Executive Committee, intrusted with all the business and interests of the Association in the interim of its meetings. They shall have power to fill any vacancies that may occur in their number, or in the list of Vice-Presidents, between any two annual meetings. Six members of the Executive Committee shall constitue a quorum.

V. The annual meeting o fthe Association shall be held in the city of Boston, on Thursday of what is known as "Anniversary Week," at such place and with such sessions as the Executive Committee may appoint, of which at least one month's previous notice shall be publicly given. Other meetings and conventions may be called by the Committee, according to their judgment, at such times and places as may seem to them desirable.

VI. These Articles may be amended at any annual meeting of the Association, by a majority vote of the members present, providing public notice of the amendment has been given with the call for the meeting.

Officers elected for the year 1886–7:

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J. A. J. WILCOX, Chelsea, Mass.
MISS A. A. BRIGHAM, Boston, Mass.

All letters pertaining to the business of the Association (payment of membership fees, etc.,) should be addressed to John C. Haynes, 451 Washington St., Boston, Mass.

Communications intended specially for the Secretary, as well as his personal correspondence, should be addressed to him at CONCORD, MASS.

F. M. HOLLAND, *Secretary F. R. A.*

MORE INDIVIDUAL EXPRESSIONS.

Commends itself on every ground.—O. B. FROTHINGHAM, Boston.

I am greatly pleased with THE OPEN COURT.—PERRY MARSHALL, Stowe, Vt.

I like THE OPEN COURT, so far, very much.—C. H. TOY, Cambridge, Mass.

I regard THE OPEN COURT as a meritorious journal.—A. H. WORTHEN, Springfield, Ill.

THE OPEN COURT is bright, interesting, scholarly and progressive.—GEO. W. CUTTER, Buffalo, N. Y.

I think you are making a paper every way worthy of being the successor of *The Index*.—F. F. DAWLEY, Cedar Rapids, Ia.

I like THE OPEN COURT as well as I did the *Index*, and I liked it TIP TOP, with twenty scores.—JOHN S. BROWN, Lawrence, Kan.

Very many thanks for numbers of THE OPEN COURT. They delight me even more than did *The Index*.—W. MAWER, Editor *The Inquirer*, London.

I should not like to be without a journal so ably conducted and devoted to so high a purpose and in so free a spirit.—Professor J. E. OLIVER, Ithaca, N.Y.

THE OPEN COURT goes ahead of *The Index* first, last and all the time.—C. W. Pease, Bridgeport, Conn.

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The admirable article by Mrs. Underwood is of itself worth far more than the subscription to the whole paper. I like also, very much, the articles by Mr. Parton, Mr. Peters, Mrs. Woolley, and (though not quite so well) the one by Mr. Janes. The only criticism I should make on the paper is an occasional fling I find there against the doctrine of a future life. The contemptuous expression, "ghost-land," seems to me to savor too much of a degrading materialism.—WM. SILSBEE, Trenton, N. Y.

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I wish to express my high estimate of THE OPEN COURT. I look upon it as the exponent of all the erudition and culture in the free-thought ranks. I wish that all free-thought journals could lift themselves upon the plane of THE OPEN COURT, cease their useless and disgusting warfare upon dead creeds and instead take a stand for a higher and broader ethical culture.—M. D. LEAHY, Liberal, Mo.